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The world we live in is a much smaller one than we faced twenty, ten, or
even five years ago. Consequently, no issue of securities regulation today can
be examined without considering its extraterritorial effects. This article offers
a unique perspective on the concerns posed by the internationalization of our
securities markets. Rather than considering how the securities laws of the
United States impact international securities transactions, the traditional
focus of commentators, my purpose is to develop a set of principles that can
guide U.S. policymakers in reaching agreement with other nations on the
minimum content of all nations' securities laws. I also suggest approaches for
bringing about a wholesale revolution in domestic securities laws because, in
the wake of international regulatory competition, dramatic and sweeping
changes in the content of U.S. securities laws are long overdue and most
certainly will occur. I will support this position with data that demonstrate
that U.S. issuers and markets are disadvantaged by the greater regulatory
demands U.S. securities laws impose as compared with the relatively light
regulation foreign governments impose on their issuers and markets.
The boldness of my thesis is that it is both inappropriate and unnecessary
to disaggregate international and domestic transactions in the formulation of
regulatory regimes. To the observers of recent regulatory developments at
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), my thesis is not simply
radical, but borders on heresy. The traditional and well-accepted response to
internationalization has been the crafting of selective accommodations for
international transactions, not changes in the domestic securities laws.
Moreover, because my thesis carries a distinct deregulatory message, it surely
will meet with skepticism from those who resist any sunsetting of disclosure or
enforcement efforts. This certain reaction will be based on the fear that any
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retreat from domestic regulation necessarily abandons the protection of U.S.
investors. As will be seen, such fear is misplaced.
II
FINANCIAL THEORY AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS
It is a debatable proposition whether-even if we lived in a perfect world
in which consensus on any aspect of securities regulation was possible among
developed nations-harmonization of securities regulation is a desirable goal.
The standard argument' favoring diversity is that it fosters experimentation
and innovation using differing regulatory approaches. The approaches that
prove to be efficient regulatory devices can lead the way for other nations to
follow. Understanding efficiency begins with a recognition that differing
regulatory approaches can be expected to embody differing costs and benefits
for investors and those regulated. Yet the trade-offs between investors and
the regulated is not a zero sum game; gains bestowed on one group diverge in
most instances from the costs they visit on others. For example, some
regulatory approaches may impose greater overall costs on issuers than the
collective benefits they confer on investors by shielding them from fraudulent
or improvident investment proposals. Similarly, the savings issuers enjoy
because of weak disclosure demands may be dwarfed by the expenditures
investors must incur to obtain the information through their own efforts.
Thus, because there are differing regulatory approaches across nations, one
can expect not only that the quality of regulation varies from nation to nation,
but that many countries will learn from and improve upon the experiences of
others and, over time, the quality of regulation for nations will generally
improve.
According to the proponents of diversity, a second benefit of diversity in
regulation is regulatory competition. Indeed, regulatory competition is the
natural product of diversity. A beneficial effect of such competition is its
potential to curb excessive laxity or rigor in any nation's securities laws. In a
sense, sister state regulators provide a market force that stands ready to
discipline any regulator tempted to embrace too little or too much regulation.
Those with too lax a regulatory scheme will be seen as a modern day Barbary
Coast, and investors will be most unwilling to launch their investment in a
vessel that will pass too close to its shores. 2 As securities offers and trades
steer past the lax regulatory shores of that state, pressure will build for the
1. See, for example, Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets:
Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J Financial Serv Res 349, 372-73 (1990). "Harmony"
may also include setting a minimum level of regulation as is done within the European Community.
See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European
Communities, 31 Harv Intl LJ 185 (1990).
2. Switzerland is a good example of a nation whose market has recently tried to improve its
overall attractiveness to foreign traders of the companies whose shares are listed on its exchange. In
Switzerland, as in many other countries, issuers have pressured the exchanges to improve disclosure
requirements and reduce barriers to international trading. Michael R. Sesit, Once Icy Stock Market
Warms to Foreigners, Wall StJ CI col 2-4 (Oct 15, 1991).
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country to bring its regulations closer to the mainstream of industrialized
countries. Similarly, the country whose regulatory zeal knows no limits can
expect its protection to be avoided by those who determine that the costs of
compliance outstrip its benefits. Once again, this can be expected to dampen
some of the regulatory zeal that otherwise will lead to disaffection.
Contemporary commentators who express comfort with regulatory
diversity follow too simple a path. Their analysis fails to identify the areas in
which regulatory uniformity and rigor are necessary to assure the competitive
regulatory equilibrium which they believe fosters productive experimentation,
innovation, and competition. Before chanting that diversity is beautiful, one
need recognize that diversity can be both a blessing and a curse, depending
upon the particular regulatory issue. Modern financial theory provides a
convenient model by which to examine why this is so and also to assist in
defining the types of disclosure issues for which diversity of regulation is not
appropriate.
Presently, U.S. securities laws require more finely-tuned disclosures by
companies competing for investor attention in U.S. securities markets than do
any foreign laws (such as Britain's). Such differences as exist between the
United States and any other country do not necessarily mean one country's
disclosure requirements are either unworthy or socially wasteful. Investors
considering investing in two competing markets will not be neutral to the
otherwise equal risks and returns posed by the investments if they recognize
that the incidence of fraud, manipulation, and unfairness is significantly lower
in one market than another because of the differences in the two countries'
securities laws. 3 Ex ante, the investor will discount the price of the security in
each market by the combined value of the average likelihood and magnitude
of the feared misconduct posed by all securities traded on that exchange.
Hence, the securities traded on the market that enjoys an overall lower
likelihood of abusive practices will ex ante trade at prices slightly higher than
they would in a less regulated market.
4
Because transborder investing can occur easily, U.S. citizens can invest
abroad in foreign issuers, but only with a healthy respect that those issuers
operate on much less rigorous regulatory footing than do U.S.-based issuers.
Under the traditional "dominance principle" of selecting investments, U.S.
investors who opt for a foreign issuer do so because of a larger return,
3. There is abundant evidence that arbitrage activity exists across international markets,
causing the prices of securities to reflect the effects of governmental policies. See, for example,
Mustafa N. Gultekin, N. Bulent Gultekin & Alessandro Penati, Capital Controls and International Capital
Market Segmentation: The Evidence from the Japanese and American Stock Markets, 44 J Finance 849 (1989).
4. Linkages among the exchanges, whereby securities are traded on more than one
international exchange, exacerbate the problems with this model. The linkage of exchanges poses
troubling jurisdictional disputes, particularly if there is no agreement on the necessity or degree of
surveillance, oversight, and proscription of conduct. Linkages can also facilitate arbitrage trading for
individual, linked stocks and therefore cannot be expected to override the impact of greater risks of a
foreign market's looser regulation of its markets. On the subject of linkages of international
exchanges, see generally Charles C. Cox & Douglas C. Michael, The Market for Markets: Development of
International Securities and Commodities Trading, 36 Cath U L Rev 833 (1987).
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assuming each investment is of the same risk classification. Even if the foreign
issuer poses more risk, the U.S. investor may still choose it because it also
carries a higher expected return than the less risky U.S. issuer, and, more
particularly, a sufficient increase in return over the U.S.-traded security to
compensate adequately for the additional riskiness. Similarly, issuers are not
bound to raise capital in their home state and will raise capital abroad when
the overall cost of capital, including all transaction costs, 5 such as those
imposed by the applicable securities laws, is lower. Where the level of
disclosure differs between two markets, as occurs between, for example, the
New York Stock Exchange and the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the securities
traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange will on average be seen as riskier than
those listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
From this perspective, it can reasonably be hypothesized that if the
additional disclosure requirements for U.S.-listed securities were in true
equilibrium such that the marginal cost of the additional disclosure did not
exceed the marginal benefit, investors and issuers would be neutral in
choosing whether to transact in New York or London. Issuers may as
frequently prefer to offer their shares in the United States, even though this
entails greater disclosure-related costs, because the securities can be sold
there at a higher price. On the other hand, an issuer may choose to avoid the
more demanding U.S. disclosure requirements by limiting its offer to foreign
markets. If an issuer does so, however, it must expect to receive a lesser
amount for its securities. Under such an equilibrium, the additional risk of
transactions in the less demanding disclosure state results in a greater
discount ex ante of the security's price, the amount of that discount being the
total of all the various losses investors endure-losses that could have been
avoided by additional disclosure-averaged across all the securities in that
market. 6
If we move beyond theory, we can find additional mileposts on the path
toward internationalization of disclosure practices. Consider the responses of
issuers and investors to diverse disclosure standards. Professors Choi and
Levich, in their survey of institutional investors and corporate issuers, found
that a variety of strategies were embraced to meet the challenge of differing
reporting standards. 7 For example, some of the institutions surveyed
5. One reason most U.S. firms do not embrace a listing on a foreign exchange is that the costs
of securing a foreign listing are not trivial, and the concomitant benefits are frequently difficult to
measure. See generally Robert F. Grondine, Access To Capital Markets: Do Costs Outweigh Benefits for
Foreign Listers?, On TSE, East Asian Exec Rep 9 (1989).
6. This theory builds on the model first suggested in George A. Akerlof, The Market for
"Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ Econ 488 (1970). The resulting
hierarchy among markets is described in A. Michael Spence, Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in
Hiring and Related Screening Processes (Harvard U Press, 1974), which also describes how many firms
may wish to signal greater reliability than the average market participant, perhaps by engaging in
disclosures beyond those mandated by the market and also having such disclosures certified by
outside accountants. Id at 92-97. See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems,
Auditors, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26J L & Econ 613 (1983).
7. Frederick D.S. Choi & Richard M. Levich, The Capital Market Effects of International Accounting
Diversity (Dow Jones-Irwin, 1990).
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circumvented the disquiet over a country's overall weak disclosure standards
by basing investment choices on methods of analysis that did not depend on
accounting-based factors." Choi and Levich report that in spite of the
availability of alternative methods of evaluation, about half of those surveyed
complained that the lack of comparability between issuers posed a serious
problem in their investment decisions. 9 Among the disclosure items posing
the greatest difficulty were segmental information, methods of asset valuation,
foreign operations disclosures, frequency and completeness of interim
information, description of capital expenditures, hidden reserves, and off-
balance sheet items.' 0 Clearly, short of uniform reporting standards, an
objective unlikely ever to be obtained, users could benefit greatly from
internationally recognized reporting standards that permit them to
reconstruct a foreign company's financial statement so it could be compared
with that of a company making disclosures under a more highly regulated
jurisdiction. Professors Choi and Levich report that because of similar
reporting standards, such comparisons can more easily be made between the
United States and the United Kingdom, while comparisons are most
troublesome for Germany, Japan, and Switzerland."l
From the issuers' point of view, nonuniformity poses less of a problem for
raising capital because of the element of choice. North American issuers find
their capital-raising decisions are not affected greatly by the difference in
foreign accounting standards because their customary U.S.-based disclosures
can be used when raising funds in foreign markets or seeking listings
abroad. 12 On the other hand, several foreign companies who do not enjoy
such reciprocity report that diversity in accounting requirements causes them
to avoid listing their shares in the United States.13 They further report that if
they raise capital in the United States, they do so through private placement
methods that avoid U.S. disclosure standards.' 4 This group of firms is most
likely to raise capital in non-U.S. markets. Interestingly, the firms in this
group also report that they still enjoy access to low-cost capital. 15 Even those
who reported paying more, preferred paying more to disclosing certain items
they viewed as proprietary information. 16
The above data offer a crisp image of the conflicting needs of investors and
issuers. The users of financial information can always be expected to embrace
the view that the more financial disclosure mandated, the better, especially if
the disclosure costs are borne by another. To be sure, we are reminded that
but for mandatory disclosure rules, users of financial information would over-
8. One way in which companies achieve this goal is by emphasizing the discounted value of
dividends-an approach that does not depend on the companies' disclosures. Id at 47.
9. Id at 44.
10. Id.
11. Idat43.
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invest in research. Mandatory disclosure rules, therefore, are an efficient
response.' 7 But as demonstrated by the above report on the behavior of
many issuers, the internationalization of securities markets permits an easy
escape from the unreasonable information demands of investors. Many
issuers find it to be in their interest to avoid listing their shares in the United
States, thus avoiding its demanding disclosure requirements;' 8 they enter U.S.
capital markets, if at all, through the private placement mechanisms for the
same reason. Not to be overlooked are the asymmetries of this freedom: U.S.
investors do not have unrestrained freedom to purchase securities abroad.
Their participation in securities transactions, whether participating in public
offerings or simply trading in equities listed on a foreign exchange, can cause
the issuers to fall within the U.S. securities laws. 19
In sum, if a true equilibrium disclosure condition existed across all
nations, investors would demand higher returns to invest in the lower-
disclosure nation than in the higher-disclosure nation. Consequently, issuers
who raise capital in a lower-disclosure nation must be prepared to receive less
for their security or to engage in nontrivial costs to signal that their security
offers less risk than that of the average security so offered.
However, the world is not the perfect model relied upon by economists.
There is a need for real can openers, not convenient assumptions.20 In the
world as we know it, the hand of government regulation is very much needed,
for it fosters, even nurtures, competition. This indeed should be seen as the
mission of securities laws. To see why this is so, consider the recent
experiences in unregulated competition among certain domestic markets over
the issue of dual class common stock. The issue of regulation arose because
of pressure on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") to permit the listing
of common shares for public shareholders when the issuer already had a
second class of common stock outstanding with enhanced or "super" voting
rights. The NYSE had historically barred dual class common stock,2 1 whereas
the National Association of Securities Dealers Stock Quotation system
17. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Casefor a Mandatoiy Disclosure System, 70
Va L Rev 717, 717-23 (1984).
18. In this regard, consider the pending request to the SEC by the NYSE that competition for
foreign issuers be allowed to list their shares on the NYSE without subjecting themselves to the
United States' generally accepted accounting standards. 24 Sec Reg & L Rep (BNA) 645-46 (May 1,
1992). See also Gregg A.Jarrell, SEC Crimps Big Board's Future, Wall StJ A10 col 3-6 (June 19, 1992).
19. For example, Regulation S, the "safe harbor" from registration under the Securities Act for
foreign offerings, is not available if U.S. residents purchase the distributed securities within any
restricted period. Under Rule 903(a) the offer must be an "offshore transaction," which is defined in
Rule 902(i) not to include purchases by a U.S. resident. Also, resales to a U.S. resident by a foreign
national who purchased abroad under Rule 904 destroys the safe harbor if it occurs within any
proscribed restricted period. See, for example, Rules 903(c)(2)(iv), (3)(ii), (3)(iii). Furthermore, the
continuous reporting requirements of the Exchange Act can be triggered if a foreign issuer's equity
security is held of record by 300 or more resident U.S. shareholders. See Exchange Act Rule 12-g 3 -
2(a), 17 CFR § 240.12g3-2(a) (1992).
20. The reference here is to the story of how an economist, a minister, and a physicist each
answered the question how he would open cans of food if stranded on an isolated island without a
can opener. The economist's answer: "Assume you have a can opener . .. ."
21. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual Rule 313.000(A)-(C) (1990).
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("NASDAQ") placed no limitation on multiple classes of voting common
stock. The American Stock Exchange ("AMEX") stationed itself between
these two positions, permitting the listing of multiple classes of common stock
if the inferior class is permitted to elect at least twenty-five percent of the
board of directors.22 The hierarchy among the exchanges over this issue has
been convincingly explained in terms of the stronger commitment of NYSE-
listed companies' managers to bond themselves to act more efficiently to
serve their stockholders' interests.2 3 The strength of that bond would be
eroded if managers could easily embrace dual classes of stock such that they
could not be displaced through a hostile takeover. In return for bonding
themselves to the higher governance standards of the NYSE, the companies
enjoyed a lower cost of capital, greater liquidity for the individual company's
shares, and a variety of pecuniary and nonpecuniary gains derived from the
enhanced reputation of being listed on the NYSE. The combination of a
pervasive threat of takeovers in the 1980s and the emergence of NASDAQas
a highly liquid and efficient market caused managers to reevaluate the costs
and benefits of being listed on the NYSE. Simply put, given the choice
between their firms reaping slightly lower capital costs and their own greater
job security, managers opted for steady paychecks and began to leave the
NYSE. Faced with defections from its elite trading posts, the NYSE pleaded
for Congress or the SEC to act to prevent managers from acting
opportunistically vis-A-vis their public shareholders.
24
The message behind the dual class voting scenario is that the rewardsfirms
garner by listing their shares on the NYSE may be overwhelmed by the costs
their managers incur by continuing to list the company's stock there. The
result of separation of ownership from management is that managers
predictably choose their conduct in a way that does not necessarily assure that
the firm's interests will also be maximized. This leads to the next observation:
competition among the exchanges is far more likely to result in a "race to the
bottom," in which the exchanges are able to develop clienteles based upon
purely managerial, rather than corporate, interests. 25 Restated from an
22. American Stock Exchange Company Guide (CCH) 10,022 (1992).
23. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder
Choice, 76 Cal L Rev 1 (1988).
24. The SEC's response was to promulgate Rule 19c-4, which required the various exchanges
and the NASD to include among their listing requirements standards barring issuers who had taken
action that would have the effect of "nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the per share
voting rights of common stock of such issuer registered under section 12 [of the Exchange Act]."
Voting Rights Listing Standards, Exchange Act Rel No 25891, Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 95,291
(1990). The rule was invalidated, however, in Business Roundtable v Securities and Exchange Commission,
905 F2d 406 (DC Cir 1990).
25. Professor Fischel takes issue with the "race to the bottom" thesis, arguing that shareholders
and investors, who enjoy an infinite number of investment opportunities, will not trust their money
with managers who seek havens where shareholders and investors can be exploited. Daniel R.
Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U Chi L Rev 119 (1987).
Professor Fischel's argument is vulnerable on the ground that shareholders are presented a distorted
choice on such questions. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Low: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 Harv L Rev 1820, 1836-40 (1989). For example,
investors may well view the corporation's decision to raise capital in Britain as driven by the desire to
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international perspective, inter-country regulatory competition is likely to
result in a race to the bottom where among the many items subject to differing
regulatory approaches are those that further solely the self-interest of
managers. 26 What disrupted the efficient differences among the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQwas not the presence or absence of a specialist system,
the question of whether pricing was more fragmented in the dispersed
NASDAQ market versus the trading posts of the two leading domestic
exchanges, or the rapidity with which orders are executed. Rather, the
disruption was that NASDAQ, and to a lesser extent AMEX, allowed purely
managerial, as opposed to corporate, interests to be served by listing
multiples classes of common stock there. Thus, the varying costs of capital
due to the relative efficiency and fairness of the competing markets played a
diminished role in each company's listing decision. The possibility for
managerial opportunism that existed under the NASDAQ and AMEX listing
requirements assured there could be no competitive equilibrium among the
markets.
Because of the phenomenon described above, it is important that the
Commission and other regulators-though they may differ on how to regulate
their respective markets-undertake a commitment that their country's
securities laws will not permit purely private decisions to overwhelm a
company's capital decisions. The goal is to promote inter-market/inter-
nation competition on matters that benefit the issuer's interest. To assure a
full competitive equilibrium among markets, such that those markets with
greater regulation reflect lower costs of capital than those that are less heavily
regulated, the individual firm's decision where to list the company's shares for
trading and where to undertake a public offering should be guided by the
regulatory impact on the company, and not exclusively by the managers'
utility function. That is, each nation's disclosure rules should disallow
managerial choices to transfer wealth from the issuer to the manager. To
permit such a transaction introduces an undesirable effect, not only on the
content of regulation, but also on competitive regulation among nations.
27
minimize issuing costs and not management's desire to avoid disclosure of its compensation
arrangement or to trade in a market where the managers' insider trading activities are less likely to be
detected or prosecuted.
26. Professor Charny has similarly raised the specter of a "race to the bottom" within the EC
member states on a range of corporate and securities issues. David Charny, Competition among
Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the
European Communities, 32 Harv Intl LJ 423 (1991). He also emphasizes the potential for managerial
opportunism to overwhelm corporate and stockholder interests in choosing the venue for
incorporation or securities transactions. Nevertheless, Professor Charny's analysis stops short of
normative suggestions that can guide EC member states in agreeing upon the minimum content of
all nations' corporate and securities laws. Indeed, it is just such a process, occurring through the
window of mutual recognition, that is the mechanism for avoiding a dysfunctional race to the bottom
with the EC. See E. Waide Warner, "Mutual Recognition" and Cross-Border Financial Services in the
European Community, 55 L & Contemp Probs 7 (Autumn 1992). See also Warren, 31 Harv Intl LJ at
185 (cited in note 1).
27. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv L Rev 1435 (1992) (identifying the shortcomings of state
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III
MANAGERIAL OPPORTUNISM AND THE CONTENT OF SECURITIES LAWS
Of paramount importance in formulating a position regarding
international agreements on the content of securities laws is what can best be
described as the abuse of "managerial opportunism." Not all concerns that
may influence managerial choice among markets competing for a firm's
offering or listing are instances of managerial opportunism. For example, an
issuer may well prefer to avoid listing its security in the United States,
believing that the additional disclosure regarding its future operations
compromises its product marketing strategies. To advance this interest of the
firm, its managers may select a capital market where a higher discount rate can
be expected due to that country's weaker disclosure laws. Because such a
decision is grounded on the issuer's interest, it falls outside the managerial
opportunism rubric. The differences in disclosure laws should be viewed as
evidence of healthy regulatory competition and not cause for the United
States to charge foul on the part of the lower-disclosing country.
In contrast, management's decision not to offer an issuer's security in U.S.
markets because of the requirement to disclose any earlier self-dealing
contracts with the issuer2 8 would be a decision guided by managerial
opportunism because the manager's desire to avoid disclosure produces no
corresponding benefit to the issuer. Thus the standard for characterizing
whether a disclosure item should be universal is whether that item is more-
than-likely to be one whose avoidance would be motivated primarily by the
private interests of the manager and not the interests of the issuer. This
standard is important because only those considerations that bear on the costs
and benefits to the issuer can be seen as having a legitimate role in
competitive regulation. Simply stated, countries that tolerate managerial
opportunism effectively cheat in this competition. Cheating countries garner
rents via weak regulation at the expense of both investor protection and fair
competition with their sister nations.
This section illustrates some areas of managerial opportunism and further
refines the principles that can guide the United States and other nations in
resolving their regulatory differences. In considering where regulating
nations should direct their efforts to reduce the likelihood that the firm's cost
of capital plays a secondary role to the manager's agenda, the reader should
be aware that no manager is likely initially to select the country where her
company will go public or even first list its securities for trading purely on
concerns of managerial opportunism. Practice reflects that strong commercial
interest and good financial sense support going public and obtaining an initial
listing in a country where the issuer already has substantial operations.
Moreover, within even medium-sized public firms, strong organizational
competition in governing corporate affairs and encouraging an expansion of the federal laws
regulating corporations).
28. See, for example, Securities Act Reg S-K Item 404, 17 CFR § 229.401 (1991).
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pressures exist for some internal controls,29  irrespective of weak
governmental directives on the same subject. Hence, a nation's securities
laws cannot be viewed as the sole bulwark against managerial opportunism.
Nevertheless, the concern posed by international regulatory competition is
not so much that the venue of initial public offerings or a firm's primary listing
will be shaped by managerial opportunism; rather, the concern is that the
later financing decisions of seasoned firms may give undue weight to their
managers' interests when making that choice. Managers are more able to
manipulate the decisions of established firms, because they already enjoy a
presence in international business that makes it financially practical to
consider offering their securities outside their home countries or obtaining
second listings in other countries. At this level, concern for managerial
opportunism runs a serious risk of deflecting the natural intermarket
equilibrium that otherwise would exist. The remaining portion of Part III
examines how concerns for managerial opportunism should inform the
content of securities law provisions directed toward market offenses and
financial disclosure.
A. Market Offenses
Market offenses are those activities undertaken for the purpose of
artificially influencing a security's price or volume. This category includes
such common offenses as falsifying financial reports and manipulating stock
prices. The universal condemnation of these offenses reflects the simple
lesson that allowing such market offenses would produce costs greatly in
excess of the corresponding competitive gains over the countries whose
markets regulate these offenses. Indeed, market offenses can be seen as the
purest form of managerial opportunism. To allow misleading announcements
permits managers to provide their own self-serving versions of their
stewardships, a temptation not many managers resist. Similarly, stock price
manipulation allows market professionals and others to profit not by their
socially productive arbitrage activities, but by their discrete and clandestine
shifts in resources among various stocks to create the false appearance of
investor interest. Proscription of false announcements and manipulation,
therefore, can be seen as having the desirable effect of channeling the
29. There are several possible sources for these interorganizational pressures. To the extent
managerial compensation is dependent on the firm's performance, a good deal of interdependence
exists among managers to avoid misbehavior that threatens their mutual benefit. Compensation is so
dependent through standard bonus or option arrangements linked to distinct performance
measurements or through serious evaluation by the board of directors. Neoclassical economists
therefore counsel linkages between compensation and changes as a natural method to reduce agency
costs. See generally Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J Fin Econ 305 (1976); Note, The Executive Compensation Contract:
Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 Stan L Rev 1147 (1985) (authored by Geoffrey S. Rehnert).
The less imminent, but by no means less feared, is the threat that a co-manager's misbehavior may
lead to a wholesale displacement of the management team and their future expected salaries.
Compare John C. Coffee, Shareholder Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich L Rev I,
73-80 (1986).
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energies of managers and market professionals into positive economic
activities. Regulating these market offenses focuses the managers' attention
on making better mousetraps and the attention of market professionals on
identifying who has made better mousetraps. Without such regulation,
managerial opportunism could threaten to crowd out these worthwhile
activities.
The universal proscription of insider trading30 can similarly be explained
as a response to grave concerns of managerial opportunism. Other than
those of the "Chicago School" who continue3 l to mimic Henry Manne's
provocative work,3 2 there is wide condemnation of insider trading, not just
among commentators, but also among developed capital markets. Such
regulation is commonly justified out of concern for unwitting investors33 or
the necessity of preserving the integrity of markets. 34 Each of these rationales
can more generally be seen as furthering the need to curb the incidence of
managerial opportunism.
Regulation of insider trading can be viewed as a nation's response to fears
of managerial opportunism in two different ways. First, a classic concern of
insider trading is preserving a market's integrity or, more specifically,
addressing investor concerns that they may be the victims of insider trading.
To see how insider trading raises these concerns, we must consider what
behavior would occur if there were a laissez-faire attitude toward insider
trading. If this were so, there would be cause to fear that managers might be
tempted to manipulate their company's disclosure practices to advance their
own insider trading agenda. For example, newsworthy events would not be
announced promptly, or at least not until the insider and others had first
captured a large share of the firms' anticipated change in value through their
own trading. Even if there were no significant developments that would cause
a price change, managers might be tempted to create intertemporal price
fluctuations through ambiguous corporate disclosures and signals; managers
could then enter the market to purchase their firm's securities at what they
knew to be a low price and then sell that security after a clarion
announcement had increased its price by removing the earlier ambiguity and
uncertainty. The ultimate seduction of a laissez-faire approach is its
encouragement to manipulate the initiation or timing of real economic events
to cause greater volatility in the firm's securities, thus creating an ongoing
30. An excellent review of the regulatory approaches to insider trading in other countries
appears in Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends in the International
Response to Insider Trading, 55 L & Contemp Probs 199 (Autumn 1992).
31. See, for example, Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
Stan L Rev 857 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 Hofstra L Rev 9 (1984).
32. Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press, 1966).
33. See, for example, William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Information on Impersonal Stock
Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule IOb-5?, 54 S Cal L Rev 1217, 1235-40
(1981) (insider trading induces unsuspecting investors to trade and also preempts the price they
otherwise would obtain).
34. See, for example, Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961).
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condition rife for insiders to capitalize on their unerodable information
advantage.
So viewed, regulation of insider trading can be seen as a necessary
prophylaxis to deal with abusive managerial decisionmaking; managers now
enjoy great discretion on such matters as the timing and relative clarity of
corporate releases,3 5 as well as what business opportunities the firm will
pursue. Such regulation addresses the uncertainty that would otherwise exist:
whether sound managerial judgment or hidden motive guided the timing and
ambiguities of an announcement, the initiation or selection of a project, or the
degree of overall business risk embraced. Not only does proscription of
insider trading remove an incentive that can seriously corrupt managerial
judgment, it also focuses regulation on more objectively verifiable behavior-
whether the manager traded while in possession of material nonpublic
information.
The second way in which regulation of insider trading can be viewed as a
manifestation of concern for managerial opportunism is the need to
understand fully the costs and benefits of managerial talent. Elsewhere I have
argued that insider trading regulation is a bare reflection of the agreement a
firm's owners and managers would have entered into if they could contract
efficiently. 36 That public laws can be viewed as default private contractual
provisions is not new to the literature of securities regulation. 37 Not
surprisingly, there is a good deal of debate among the commentators over
precisely what the parties would have contracted for had they done so at the
outset of their relationship. A superb example of the indefiniteness of this
inquiry is found in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc. ,38 where Judges Easterbrook
and Posner reach opposite conclusions about whether an employee-owner,
who was required to sell his shares to the corporation at their book value
upon leaving the firm's employ, would have negotiated ex ante disclosure of
particular material nonpublic information about the firm by its managers
when the employee was considering changing jobs. Nevertheless, the
contracting paradigm offers a useful mechanism for examining the content of
legal rules, and, in the case of insider trading, it further illustrates that
managerial opportunism is at the core of international regulatory concern in
this area.
35. In this regard, consider how weak a corporation's obligation is with respect to correcting
investors' misimpressions when the false information is not attributable to the corporation. See
Elkind v Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F2d 156, 164 (2d Cir 1980). Corporations can delay the release of
material information so long as there is a business justification for nondisclosure. State Teachers
Retirement Bd. v Fluor Corp., 654 F2d 843 (2d Cir 1981). Furthermore, when a correction is necessary,
ample time and deference are accorded the corporation to assure a fair and clear corrective
announcement. See Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F2d 514 (10th Cir
1973).
36. James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School," 1986
Duke L J 628, 655-59.
37. This view is most frequently advanced in the area of corporate law, see Frank R. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 34 (1991), but it is easily portable to
securities law matters. Id at 276-90.
38. 815 F2d 429 (7th Cir 1987).
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The linchpin for all contracting in the publicly traded corporation is the
separation of owners and managers. The gulf that separates the two assures
that managers have far greater information about the costs and benefits of
their contribution to the firm. Rational investors minimally do not desire an
open-ended compensation arrangement with their firms' managers. Under an
open-ended compensation schedule, a manager's total compensation package
bears no relationship to the firm's performance or the individual manager's
contribution to that performance. Transparency, or full disclosure, is crucial
to the policing of managerial behavior. Insider trading regulation promotes
transparency because it eliminates the possibility that managers will
supplement their visible compensation schedules with clandestine gains
reaped through their advance knowledge of their firms' activities. Absent
universal insider trading regulation, managers could raise capital and list
shares in safe havens for insider trading. Allowing insider trading, therefore,
would provide the opportunity to circumvent the most primary of all
contractual understandings managers have with owners: providing fair
compensation for their services.
The preceding discussion does not merely offer concrete illustrations of
abuses that have earned uniform condemnation; it more importantly explains
each type of market offense as a form of managerial opportunism. So
explained and understood, each market offense can be linked to the
international competitive model described in Part II so that the importance of
addressing the incidence and possibilities of managerial opportunism gains
renewed importance in the dialogue among nations on the content of their
own securities laws. The next section explores the limits of managerial
opportunism in the more difficult setting, the content of financial disclosure.
B. Financial Disclosure
In contrast to the nearly universal proscription of market offenses,
reporting obligations vary widely among developed nations. 39 In the area of
financial disclosure, U.S. companies, market professionals, and regulators
most loudly complain that the rest of the world's securities markets must
make dramatic changes in their securities laws so that U.S. issuers and markets
are not unduly disadvantaged by the more demanding U.S. disclosure
standards. In these discussions, one is repeatedly reminded that the depth,
detail, and frequency of U.S. disclosure requirements are unrivaled anywhere
in the world. Such domestic complaints receive added force when they are
joined by a chorus of foreign issuers who object to the added disclosure
burdens they incur when offering or listing securities in the United States.40
In the face of these complaints, the United States has three regulatory
choices. First, it could hold the line and continue its efforts to move foreign
39. See generally Scott D. Cohen, Survey of Registration and Disclosure Requirements in International
Securities Markets, 9 Mich Yearbook of Intl Legal Studies 243 (1988).
40. Robert P. Austin, Regulatory Principles and the Internationalization of Securities Markets, 50 L &
Contemp Probs 221 (Summer 1987).
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disclosure standards closer to those mandated by U.S. securities laws.
Second, it could selectively accommodate the special needs of foreign issuers
by exempting them from domestic disclosure demands or third, it could
reevaluate U.S. disclosure standards with a view toward placing U.S.
companies and markets on a more competitive footing with foreign
companies and markets. As will be seen in this section, as well as in Part IV,
this process is delicate and need not lead to wholesale revision of the
mandatory disclosure requirements.
These three regulatory choices are not mutually exclusive; they can, of
course, be pursued simultaneously with respect to different disclosure items.
For example, the first option could be pursued with respect to the meaning of
"independence" when applied to the firm's outside accountants and,
simultaneously, the SEC could discontinue line of business reporting as a
required disclosure item. Nevertheless, the second option, according foreign
regulators less demanding disclosure burdens than their U.S. counterparts, is
clearly not a viable option. This approach has distinct political costs, for in
today's political and economic environment one cannot long survive by
championing a position that places domestic companies, markets, or workers
at a competitive disadvantage to foreign companies, markets, or workers.
This approach also makes poor regulatory sense. To embrace different
disclosure obligations for companies that are competing for capital robs the
process of its ultimate objective of comparability. The central objective of
mandatory disclosure is to facilitate investor choice among competing
investment opportunities by providing easily comparable information about
each opportunity. Any disclosure policy that permits foreign issuers to satisfy
U.S. disclosure standards with information that cannot easily be translated
into U.S. disclosure format or content for easy comparisons conflicts with the
overall purpose of mandatory disclosure.4' Determining which of the three
options (realistically only the first and/or third options) to apply to a
particular item requires a unifying philosophy for international disclosure.
Once again, the learning obtained from Part II can help formulate the best
approach for specific disclosure issues.
To illustrate, the article next examines several financial disclosure issues
against the model of international markets and managerial opportunism that
was developed in Part II. Specifically, the issues examined are the reporting
of accounting changes, methods of reserve accounting, consolidated financial
reporting, line of business reporting, and management discussion and
41. Companies that do not list their shares on an exchange or authorize their trading through
NASDAQ but nonetheless have 300 or more U.S. resident stockholders can comply with the
continuous disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act by filing so-called "home country
information." See Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 CFR § 240.12g3-2(b). Moreover, even foreign
registrants who are not able to avail themselves of this provision are relieved of disclosing some of
the information that their U.S. counterparts must disclose. For example, they are exempt from the
quarterly reporting requirements and the proxy rules. See generally Harold S. Bloomenthal, 3C
Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 15.13[3][b] (Clark Boardman, 1991 revision).
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analysis of financial reports. To add concreteness to this analysis, the specific
disclosure practices of Japan and the United States are contrasted.
The common quest of managers for security and reputation can also plant
the seeds for managerial opportunism, which frequently takes the form of an
opportunistic use of legitimate accounting standards. The propensity to
manipulate accounting methods is underscored by the well-documented
prevalence of income-smoothing among managers. 42 Managers have strong
incentives to avoid disclosing abrupt and significant changes in revenues,
costs, and earnings, particularly if changes in these items are less favorable
than those of prior years. 43  Hence, managers' desire to minimize
intertemporal changes in revenues, costs, and earnings. This objective can be
achieved by a deft use of discretion over accounting choices so as to smooth
the valleys and peaks that otherwise would appear in the company's trend
lines for sales, expenses, and income.
Interestingly, while empirical data supports the belief that managers of
U.S. corporations engage in income smoothing, there is also abundant
evidence that income smoothing does not fool the market.44 Its inability to
mislead the market can be attributed to the nearly two decades-long
requirement that when a material accounting change occurs, there must be
disclosure of enough information to permit investors to determine what the
reported results would have been had the change in estimate or principle not
been made. 45 Indeed, this is a prevalent feature of U.S. disclosure laws.
Where more than one reporting choice is available, companies are permitted
to exercise a choice, so long as enough collateral disclosure is made to enable
users of financial statements to determine reported income or financial
position under a different method. This feature is not so much a protection
against fraud as it is a means of assuring comparability among reporting
companies.
In sharp contrast to prevailing U.S. accounting practices, Japanese
accounting methods are concerned with reporting the use of companies'
"reserves." Reserves are common in Japanese companies and exist for such
diverse purposes as retirement and severance benefits as well as to absorb the
cost of extraordinary items.46 Because reserves are highly discretionary items
with additions and withdrawals requiring a minimum of disclosure, they can
be used to smooth reported income from year to year. Further discretion
exists with respect to foreign currency translations. Multinational Japanese
corporations that have a presence internationally through branches, divisions,
42. See generally James D. Cox, Financial Information, Accounting and the Law: Cases and Materials
ch 7, at 443-99 (Little Brown, 1980).
43. William J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and Growth 101-03 (Harcourt, Brace & World,
1967).
44. See, for example, Robert K. Eskew & William F. Wright, An Empirical Analysis of Diferential
Capital Market Reactions to Extraordinary Accounting Items, 31 J Finance 651 (1976); Robert S. Kaplan &
Richard Roll, Investor Evaluation of Accounting Information: Some Empirical Evidence, 45 J Bus 225 (April,
1972).
45. See A.I.C.P.A. APB Opinion No 22 (1922).
46. Takeji Yamashita, Japan's Securities Markets: A Practitioner's Guide (Butterworths, 1989).
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and subsidiaries in numerous countries necessarily encounter the question of
how to translate such off-shore profits and losses into yen. Whereas in the
United States there is a highly stylized approach to such translation, 47 in Japan
there is a good deal of laxity in disclosure standards for foreign exchange
translations. For example, Japanese corporations are not bound to use the
currency of the country where a transaction occurs and Japanese corporations
can apply different transaction rates for subsidiaries and branches. 48 Overall,
this freedom provides a powerful temptation and expedient mechanism for
Japanese managers to affect overall results, not only by the exchange rate
selected, but also by deft characterization of the off-shore entity as a branch or
a subsidiary.
Quite a different potential for manipulating reported results arises in the
area of consolidated accounting. For many years, the United States has fairly
rigidly controlled when a parent corporation must issue consolidated financial
statements. 49  In broad overview, U.S. reporting standards require
consolidation when a corporation directly or indirectly owns fifty percent or
more of another company. Additionally, the so-called "equity method" of
including another corporation's position and performance is required when
twenty to fifty percent ownership exists. Japan, however, does not require50
consolidation if the subsidiary's assets, sales, and income are ten percent or
less than those of the consolidated enterprise. 51 Thus, Japanese reporting
standards accord the parent corporation great discretion when to consolidate
a subsidiary's earnings with those of the parent, providing the subsidiary,
although substantially owned, is not so sizable as to trigger the ten percent
standard; under U.S. reporting standards, such discretion does not exist. This
has, on occasion, allowed the practice of "window dressing," whereby profits
and losses can be hidden in the accounts of subsidiaries, going unreported on
their affiliated companies' accounts. In this regard, consider Tomio Shida's
analysis of the issue of consolidated versus unconsolidated reporting:
[I]s there always a big difference between consolidated and unconsolidated
earnings in Japan? The answer is no, generally speaking. A survey comparing parent-
only and consolidated earnings for the latest terms available indicates that out of more
than 2,000 listed companies, the consolidated earnings of over 400 were more than
1.1 times bigger than parent-only figures, and that the consolidated earnings of 50
were more than two times as large ....
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun forecast the 1987 . . . business performance of 802
manufacturers and non-manufacturers listed on the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya stock
exchanges. Consolidated net income is expected to grow an average 10.9 percent and
47. See A.I.C.P.A. APB Opinion Nos 16 & 17 (1970).
48. Yamashita,Japan's Security Markets at 245 (cited in note 46).
49. See note 45.
50. Even though not required, some Japanese companies have voluntarily disclosed such
information, finding that the positive reaction of investors is a benefit sufficient at least to incur the
extra costs of such consolidated reporting. Groups Releasing Consolidated Results: Disclosure No Longer
Confined Only to Parent,Japan EconJ 36 col 1-3 (June 23, 1990); Tomio Shida, MOF Adopts Lax Rule on
Disclosure, Japan Econ J 1 (Jan 19, 1991) (While some release consolidated information, most issuers
are relieved the Ministry of Finance backed away from mandating such disclosure.).
51. Shida, Japan Econ J at 247 (cited in note 50).
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parent-only net income 7.1 percent, meaning that consolidated net income will be
about 1.2 times larger than parent-only net income.
Since unconsolidated or parent-only estimates become available before
consolidated ones, investors are most accustomed to them, and, generally, there are
not many differences between the two sets of figures. Securities houses compete in
being the first to provide investors with accurate unconsolidated estimates. These
estimates are published in newspapers and they are convenient for investors to grasp a
general trend for the year ahead.
5 2
One can view this situation less sanguinely than Mr. Shida. Some twenty
percent of the sampled firms had consolidated earnings at least ten percent
greater than those reported for the parent. 53 Moreover, one should consider
the incentives such weak disclosure demands provide for analysts to garner
inside information for their clients about a firm's likely consolidated
performance. That is, an important function Japanese brokers serve is filling-
in the disclosure gaps by seeking and purveying "the real" information about
Japanese issuers. This information is dignified by being referred to as
"analysts' forecasts," but nonetheless arises because of the lacunae within
Japan's disclosure rules. The condition reflects the way in which weak
disclosure rules make insider trading more likely and also leads to pricing
inefficiencies because analysts' predictions, while filling a gap, can be
expected to be less reliable than those provided by the firm itself.54
A different disclosure issue is illustrated by a report that inJune 1989, Akai
Electric Company, an audio equipment manufacturer, issued a one-page
release announcing revisions to its earnings forecast for the year. The brief
release announced the company expected to post a pretax recurring loss of
Y2.79 billion. Virtually no information was disclosed that would have
enabled investors to assess whether the unexpected drop in earnings was due
to sustained competition or strategic miscalculations by management; nor did
the report shed light on how long the adverse conditions were likely to
continue. 55
This situation should be contrasted with what occurs in the United States,
where the "Management Discussion and Analysis" portion of Regulation S-K
requires companies in such situations to disclose known conditions and trends
that are reasonably likely to have a material effect on earnings, assets, or
liabilities. 56  Japan's disclosure requirements do not impose a similar
52. Id at 248-49. The survey referred to is identified by the author as Kaisha Shikiho (Company
Quarterly), Toyo Keizai Shiinposha, first quarter 1988.
53. Parents are under no obligation to report their affiliates' earnings if they either own less than
50% of the affiliate or the affiliate's earnings or assets are no more than 10% of the firm's assets,
sales, and income. Yamashita, Japan's Securities Markets at 247-48 (cited in note 46).
54. See, for example, Bikki Jaggi, Further Evidence on the Accuracy of Management Forecasts Vis-d-Vis
Analysts' Forecasts, 55 Acct Rev 96 (1980).
55. TSE's Handling of Disclosure Leaves Insiders, Public in DarkJapan EconJ 32 (Nov 4, 1989). The
report also disclosed that the company's president did selectively explain the factors contributing to
the unexpected loss to the company's banks. Id.
56. Securities Act Reg S-K Item 303, 17 CFR § 229.303. See generally Financial Information
Rel No 36, Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 73,193 (1989). To be sure, the Management Discussion and
Disclosure does not apply to press releases but does come into effect with the periodic disclosures
mandated for reporting companies. See, for example, Form 10-Q, Part 1, Item 2.
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obligation to explain or identify whether the conditions contributing to the
loss are likely to continue and, if so, with what general effects. Thus, one can
find in the Akai Electric illustration criticism not just of Japanese disclosure
laws but also of the laws of most countries other than the United States,
because they lack the detail and depth of the U.S. disclosure requirements.
A final illustration involves the reporting of line of business information.
U.S. companies are required to disclose certain financial information for any
product or group of products that account for at least ten percent of an
enterprise's total profits. If a product meets this criterion, the company must
report its revenues, profits, or losses, and the assets used for the product or
group of products. 57 Issuers generally have opposed segmental reporting
because they believe disclosures based on specific product lines can rob the
firm of potential competitive advantages. Nevertheless, the information is
required by U.S. disclosure rules because of its demonstrative usefulness to
investors. 58 In contrast, Japan's disclosure laws do not require line of
business reporting. 5
9
As reviewed above, Japan provides weaker financial reporting rules for
each of the items examined-changes in accounting method, reserve
accounting, foreign currency translations, consolidated reporting,
management discussion and analysis, and line of business reporting. Not all
of these items, however, raise the specter of managerial opportunism. Even
when this specter is raised, there is sometimes an additional consideration,
identified below, that excuses compliance with an international standard for
uniform minimum disclosure. For example, weaknesses in consolidated
reporting, reserve accounting, and foreign currency translations enable
managerial opportunism that can cause Japanese corporations to consider
factors other than their stockholders' interests when deciding whether to seek
a listing abroad or to undertake a global offering. Similarly, under prevailing
accounting standards, Japanese managers enjoy broad discretion to smooth
income through accounting changes. Such behavior impairs listing and
offering decisions, and thereby poses serious questions to those concerned
with fosterinv' regulatory diversity and competition in securities markets.
Finally, the disclosure requirements in Japan and most other non-U.S.
countries are much less stylized and penetrating than those that exist in the
United States.
Certainly this point is underscored by the increasing disclosure demands
the SEC imposes on issuers through the management discussion and analysis
of each domestic issuer's basic disclosure package. Each of the Japanese
disclosure weaknesses can therefore be seen as presenting fertile ground for
the type of managerial opportunism that can defeat a competitive regulatory
57. See, for example, F.A.S.B. Statements Nos 14, 30.
58. See, for example, Daniel Collins, SEC Line-of-Business Reporting and Earnings Forecasts, 4 J Bus
Res 117 (1976).
59. Yamashita, Japan's Securties Markets at 245 (cited in note 46). In practice, most Japanese
companies that disclose segment information disclose on sales revenues for certain industry groups.
Id.
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hierarchy. Such a competitive hierarchy has in the past served as a norm upon
which countries could productively base their individual regulatory
preferences.
At first blush, foreign disclosure weaknesses may appear to demand
regulatory uniformity because of the perception that any country retreating
from the norm invites the embrace of managerial opportunism, Yet
uniformity need not be the ultimate objective. Strategic reform of individual
aspects of securities laws may be a better approach. For example, the
disclosure issues posed by the Akai illustration and by line of business
reporting contrast with the problems arising from the Japanese treatment of
hidden reserves and weak consolidated reporting standards. The former bear
on the completeness with which an externally caused event occurs, where the
latter openly invite manipulation. Each of these disclosure items raises
traditional concerns for the amount of disclosure mandated and the lack of
depth and detail in the disclosure. But policymakers should view disclosure
items that raise concerns about completeness very differently than those
disclosure questions that invite manipulation.
The issue of mandatory disclosure of line of business information points
out the classic conflict between those who prepare financial statements and
those who use them. To the latter, more disclosure is always better, but to the
former, this is not always true. Some fear that absent mandatory disclosure
rules, there will be an overexpenditure of societal resources by financial
statement users who will needlessly duplicate each other's efforts. 60 The call
for mandatory disclosure on this basis is further enforced by the belief that
the security's issuer is likely to have the lowest costs to produce the
information and that the issuer's information will be more accurate. A final
argument for mandatory disclosure is that absent such rules, there will be
delays in disclosure by managers seeking personal gain by capitalizing on
their advance knowledge of their company's progress and performance.
At the same time, the reporting company's concerns must also be
recognized. Adding depth and detail to financial disclosures entails nontrivial
tangible costs, especially when the precise proscription of that depth and
60. Professor Hirshleifer shows how those seeking information predicting future price changes
in traded securities will overinvest in the search for information in a pure exchange economy. Jack
Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Incentive Activity, 61 Am Econ Rev
561 (1971). More recently Professor Stout has extended Hirshleifer's theory to question SEC
regulatory initiatives premised in part on improving the efficiency of securities markets. Lynn A.
Stout, The Unimportance of Being Eficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities
Regulation, 87 Mich L Rev 613 (1988). In fact, she counsels that "[g]overnment policies that enhance
efficiency do so only at the margin." Id at 638. Professor Stout appears to give too much weight to
earlier studies by well-recognized critics of mandatory disclosure, see for example, George J.
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63
Am Econ Rev 132 (1973), and not to consider more fully the weaknesses of those studies. See Joel
Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J Corp L 1 (1983) (providing
a close analysis of the weakness of studies by Benston and others to conclude their data justify a
mandatory disclosure system).
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detail is embodied in technical government directives. 61 Furthermore, it can
easily be foreseen that disclosure of some information may pose serious
regulatory and competitive problems for companies doing business
internationally. For example, it may well be that line of business information
will raise new questions regarding "dumping" violations or whether
allocation of tax liabilities among various host nations is consistent with
results reported on financial statements. Moreover, disclosure issues cannot
always be dictated solely by the needs of financial statement users because, as
seen above, as long as the information is a free good to the users of financial
information, it will always be over consumed.
The issue posed by the "window dressing" or manipulation possibilities
inherent with hidden reserves and weak consolidated reporting requirements
touch on a more fundamental concern-the outright discretion of managers
to create assets and earnings by their own fiat. In contrast, the Akai Electric
illustration and line of business reporting bear on how real transactions,
carried out at arm's length, should be reported so that underlying economic
events will not be obfuscated. The legerdemain that is permissible with
reserve accounting and weak principles of consolidated reporting for
subsidiaries has a slightly different effect, obscuring to the user of financial
information whether there in fact was a real economic event that explains
reported assets, sales, and income. Furthermore, there is little concern for
revealing corporate strategic plans or otherwise compromising the corporate
interest in those financial reporting areas where lax standards permit window
dressing to occur. On the other hand, line of business reporting can
frequently pose a dilemma of advancing investor interests at the expense of
the reporting corporation.
Thus it would appear that in the realm of disclosure standards, all
countries should purge from their financial reporting standards those aspects
that permit financial statements to create the false appearance of economic
activity. For example, reserve and consolidated accounting should be
structured so as to remove the flexibility managers otherwise have to engage
in "window dressing." Such a reform effort would not require prohibiting
reserves or mandated uniformity in consolidated financial statement
standards and practices. Individual differences in these areas pose no serious
problems to international markets, provided managers' discretionary
reporting choices are sufficiently disclosed. That is, the appropriate
international response to reserve accounting and other practices that permit
managerial discretion to interdict the accounting reports is not to prohibit
such activities but to require transparency. 62 This can occur, as it does in the
61. For example, a decade ago it was roughly estimated that the costs of the U.S. disclosure
system for publicly traded firms was no less than $1 billion. Susan M. Philips &J. Richard Zecher,
The SEC and the Public Interest 51 (MIT Press, 198 1).
62. The above suggestion does not mean that U.S. reporting standards never provide their own
opportunities for window dressing. Consider the present collision course between, on the one hand,
the SEC's renewed emphasis on companies reporting the fair market value (as contrasted with
historical costs) of their investment portfolios and, on the other hand, the Financial Accounting
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United States, by requiring collateral disclosure of the effects of
management's accounting choices. The collateral disclosure should be
sufficient to permit users of financial statements to extrapolate from the
disclosed information what financial results would have come about had
management not so exercised its discretion. Such a regulatory response not
only assures comparability across all issuers-domestic and foreign-but also
rids disclosure choices of the sharpest form of managerial opportunism. In
other areas, such as the degree of disclosure that accompanies events such as
the announcement by Akai or line of business reporting, individual
differences among countries should not be seen as dysfunctional. 63 On these
types of issues, as seen earlier, countries with lax disclosure requirements will
find their markets characterized by lower disclosure costs but higher capital
costs. In this respect, regulatory competition establishes a useful hierarchy of
markets so that issuers may choose the disclosure regime that best fits their
needs, and individual countries may pursue their own distinct disclosure
philosophies.
IV
ACCOMMODATING FOREIGN ISSUERS: THE LIMITS OF
THE DE MINIMIs RULE
It is a well-established principle of both choice of law and international
public law that deference to the law of a foreign state is justified when that
state has the larger contact with a transaction. 64 Deference is especially called
for when applying the foreign state's law would not offend local policy.
Recently, the Commission has been sensitive to this approach and restrained
its regulatory reach accordingly. Thus, in its releases dealing with cross-
border tender offers, 65 the Commission offered several accommodations in
the application of the Williams Act provisions and shortened registration
under the Securities Act for multinational tender offers and exchange offers
by non-U.S. bidders. In broad overview, the proposed rules will permit a
Standards Board ("FASB") Statement No. 12, which currently permits recognizing gains on
marketable securities only when they are sold. The present position of the FASB allows companies
to engage in "cherry picking," that is, when companies discretely sell those portfolio stocks with
gains, they can put a more positive face on their financial performance in what otherwise would be a
poor fiscal period. Recently the FASB, under pressure from various financial institutions, refused to
succumb to the view being advocated by the SEC, setting the stage for the possibility that the SEC
may issue its own reporting standard on the subject. See Lee Berton, FASB Balks on Current-Market
Rules for Banks as Member Switches His Vote, Wall StJ A3 col 2-3 (Uan 16, 1992).
63. For example, a disclosure hierarchy exists among U.S. issuers disclosing line of business
information in terms of the degree of detail in which information is analyzed in the management
discussion and analysis section of the SEC filing. SeeJohn W. Bagby, Marilyn R. Kintzele & Philip L.
Kintzele, Management Discussion of Business Performance: An Analytical and Empirical Evaluation, 26 Am
Bus LJ 57, 84-96 (1988).
64. See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 401-
03, 416 (1986). See generally Robert W. Hillman, Cross-Border Investment, Conflict of Laws, and the
Privatization of Securities Law, 55 L & Contemp Probs 331 (Autumn 1992).
65. Securities Act Rel No 6897, and Exchange Act Rel No 29275 [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed
Secur L Rptr (CCH) 84,803 (1991).
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non-U.S. bidder to comply primarily with foreign disclosure, procedural, and
accounting requirements, and in exchange will allow the bidder to fulfill its
U.S. disclosure obligations through use of its home country's listing
requirements. These accommodations apply only where the target shares
held by U.S. investors constitute a small portion of the outstanding shares of
the target company.
66
The initial appeal of these proposals is that absent such accommodations,
U.S. holders stand a very good chance of being excluded from the tender or
exchange offer. This concern is embodied in the condition that the proposals
on the tender or exchange offer not have a substantial impact on U.S.
investors when viewed in the context of all the outstanding shares of the
target corporation. The accommodations advance the interests of both
foreign bidders and U.S. holders, placing the latter on an equal footing with
their foreign counterparts. Otherwise, if U.S. holders could not participate in
the tender offer, the bidder could acquire its shares later, through a
disadvantageous freezeout merger, which could occur without compliance
with U.S. disclosure rules. Also, from a corporate governance perspective,
there should be less U.S. concern when the target corporation is owned
mainly by holders who do not reside in the United States. The profile of such
a corporation suggests its business operations are also significantly outside
the United States.
In making these proposals, the Commission suggests that concerns for
U.S. holders outweigh any complaint about horizontal unfairness advanced by
a U.S. competing bidder. The U.S. bidder may be frustrated that its foreign
rival enjoys greater freedoms with respect to proration, withdrawal rights, and
disclosure such that the U.S. bidder operates at a serious disadvantage. 67 One
would expect that the second shoe to drop will be a greater willingness on the
Commission's part to assure a truly level playing field by freely granting to
such a competing U.S. bidder exemptions from those provisions of the
Williams Act that the foreign bidder is not burdened by as a consequence of
the exemptions now proposed by the SEC.
So viewed, it would appear that cross-border tender and exchange offer
proposals can be normative in guiding relaxation of U.S. securities laws in the
66. Relief from the Williams Act provisions applies so long as the U.S. security holders own
10% or less of the class of securities sought in the tender offer. With reference to relief from § 5
registration when an exchange offer is made by a non-U.S. bidder, proposed Rule 802 applies if the
value of the securities being offered does not exceed $5 million, and registration on proposed Form
F-12 will be available if the securities held by U.S. holders prior to the exchange offer are no more
than 10% of the securities sought in the exchange.
67. For example, one theme of the federal takeover rules is the facilitation of an auction for the
firm by removing some of the pressure on target shareholders to tender their shares. Thus Rule 14d-
8, which pro rates the bidder's acceptance of its oversubscribed offer at the end of the offer rather
than at some earlier time, and Rule 14d-7 extend the right to withdraw tendered shares up to the
close of the offer. In the absence of such provisions, the target shareholders could be unduly
pressured to tender quickly or face proration, or if a competing offer appeared, would not be able to
withdraw previously tendered shares. One can thus see how a U.S. bidder competing with a foreign
bidder could be disadvantaged if the foreign bidder did not have to comply with takeover rules that
were binding on the U.S. bidder.
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face of conflicting regulation abroad. Deference to the home country
regulation would appear justified whenever the particular regulatory issue has
a de minimis connection to U.S. markets. Such a principle, however, provides
only a momentary respite from the disproportionate rigor of U.S. securities
laws.
To illustrate, consider how the de minimis rule fails to overcome the
anticompetitive effects of U.S. distribution rules. The most pervasive of the
distribution rules is Rule lOb-6,68 which prohibits key participants in a
distribution of securities from artificially enhancing the offering's appearance
to investors through simultaneous market purchases that nudge the price
upwards. Those who purchase a distributed security, however, frequently
resell the security in its aftermarket. Excessive selling in the after market
makes it more difficult for the underwriters to dispose of their unsold
allotments; this is particularly true if such selling pressure causes the price of
the distributed security to decline below its offering price. Designed to
counteract this effect, Rule lOb-7 69 authorizes stabilizing purchases during a
distribution. The dual effects of complying with Rule lOb-7 are that
purchases are not deemed to be manipulative or deceptive, as that term is
used in Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and, furthermore, that the
purchases and bids do not violate Rule 1Ob-6's bar to purchases during a
distribution. 70 Rule l0b-7's requirements are many, and all are technical, but,
in general, the rule limits the stabilizing bids and purchases to one price,
which generally is the security's last independently established sales price.
7 1
To illustrate the disjunction that such complex distribution rules pose to
globalized offerings, consider the regulatory framework that applies to
offerings that occur over the London Stock Exchange. Section 47(2) of the
Financial Services Act embodies Britain's equivalent to the United States'
Rule lOb-5 in its proscription of "engag[ing] in any course of conduct which
creates the false or misleading impression as to the market in or the price" of
a security. The Financial Services Act has no equivalent to Rule lOb-6's
prophylactic proscription, but pursuant to its powers under the Act, 72 the
Securities and Investments Board, as part of its business conduct rules, has
issued somewhat technical rules permitting stabilization during a security's
distribution. 73 Within this framework, the conflict in regulatory patterns is
not among the proscriptions of manipulation or with the differing approaches
toward stabilizing purchases (although the latter does indeed pose a conflict
to the extent they do not replicate one another).
68. 17 CFR § 240.10b-6 (1992).
69. 17 CFR § 240.10b-7.
70. Similarly, Rule lOb-8 is designed to facilitate rights offerings by allowing its distribution
participants to bid for and purchase the rights and their underlying security, within certain limits.
71. Rule l0b-7(j)(l), 17 CFR § 240.10b-7(j)(1).
72. Financial Services Act § 48(7) (1986) (Eng).
73. Securities and Investments Board, 1987 Rules, Rule 10.05. See generally Norman S. Poser,
International Securities Regulations 136 (1991).
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As the Commission has recently recognized, Rule lOb-6 creates an
ongoing conflict with practices and methods of distributing securities
abroad.74 Some of the conflict may be relieved by Commission proposals to
exempt from the distribution rules (but not the overall antifraud provisions)
certain international rights offerings. 75 Also, through its no-action letters, the
Commission has selectively granted exemptions from its distribution rules.
76
In each case, the exemption was premised in part on the stipulation that no
such purchases or bids be effected in the United States and that they occur on
a "designated offshore securities market,"' 77 the latter being one that the SEC
has approved in part because of the existence of foreign government
oversight.
To be sure, the concessions the Commission has made in exempting
foreign issuers from the distribution rules have been cautious and limited in
scope. They are based on the same de minimis reasoning as the proposed
cross-border tender and exchange offer exemptions. But note how different
an issue is posed by relaxing the distribution rules when securities are
simultaneously offered in the United States and abroad, and when there is
reason to expect arbitrage across markets to have an impact on the price in
U.S. markets. The anticompetitive effect of this approach is that, from the
U.S. perspective, it creates the wrong incentive. Exempting conduct that
74. Securities Act Rel No 6896, Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) $$ 81,715, 81,727 (1991).
75. The proposed exemption will apply to rights offerings qualifying to use proposed Rule 801,
which is limited to offerings not exceeding $5 million or those that can utilize proposed Form F- 11,
which incorporates in its entirety the disclosure requirements of the issuer's home jurisdiction.
76. See, for example, The International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Ireland Ltd. (Sept 29, 1987), Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 78,713 (1987).
77. The relevant regulation provides as follows:
(a) Designated Offshore Securities Market. Designated offshore securities market means:
(1) The Eurobond market, as regulated by the Association of International Bond Dealers;
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange; the Australian Stock Exchange Limited; the Bourse de
Bruxelles; the Frankfurt Stock Exchange; The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited; The
International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, Ltd.; the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange; the Bourse de Luxembourg; the Borsa Valori di Milan; the
Montreal Stock Exchange; the Bourse de Paris; the Stockholm Stock Exchange; the Tokyo
Stock Exchange; the Toronto Stock Exchange; the Vancouver Stock Exchange; and the
Zurich Stock Exchange; and
(2) Any foreign securities exchange or non-exchange market designated by the
Commission. Attributes to be considered in determining whether to designate such a
foreign securities market, among others, include:
(i) Organization under foreign law;
(ii) Association with a generally recognized community of brokers, dealers, banks, or
other professional intermediaries with an established operating history;
(iii) Oversight by a governmental or self-regulatory body;
(iv) Oversight standards set by an existing body of law.
(v) Reporting of securities transactions on a regular basis to a governmental or self-
regulatory body;
(vi) A system for exchange of price quotations through common communications media;
and
(vii) An organized clearance and settlement system.
17 CFR § 230.902 (1992).
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occurs beyond U.S. shores most surely will direct more and more transactions
overall to foreign markets.
78
This market exodus will not occur with the exemption proposed for cross-
border tender and exchange offers. The effect of this exemptive action is not
to drive the tender offer to another country's markets, but rather to assure
equal participation for U.S. residents in a tender offer that otherwise meets
the minimal disclosure and procedural requirements of a foreign country.
Just as Willie Sutton robbed banks because "that's where the money is,"79 the
United States can continue to impose its own tender offer rules for those
companies of which a majority of the stock is held by U.S. residents, without
fear of otherwise leaving them to the vices of a "back-end freezeout." But
when U.S.-based ownership is so slight that control can be acquired by the
bidder without extending a bid to the U.S. holders, concerns of equal
participation overwhelm the application of U.S. tender offer rules. In
contrast, the distribution rules are not within Willie Sutton's sage advice, for
money and markets are everywhere, certainly not exclusively in the United
States. Thus, discrete exemptions from the distribution rules based on the
transaction's minimal contact with U.S. markets only assures that U.S. markets
will be increasingly disfavored by those laying the venue for globalized
offerings.
The impact that internationalization has had on the SEC's exemptive
powers and construction of the distribution rules is a dramatic illustration of
overregulation that has far-reaching effects. That Rule lOb-6 is one of the
most frequent subjects of no-action letter requests80 is strong evidence that
the breadth of the rule's prohibitions touches legitimate and commercially
necessary transactions in its attempt to shield a distributed security's price
78. Its exemptive activities, however, underscore both the well-recognized breadth of Rule lOb-
6 in particular and how seriously out of step Rule 10b-6 is with the distribution rules that apply in
other countries. It would appear beyond doubt that the overall force of recent Supreme Court cases
is that a violation of Rule 1Ob-6 cannot occur without a substantial showing of both deception and
scienter, neither of which, however, are within its lengthy elaborate proscriptions. Because the rule
threatens and thereby regulates those whose behavior lacks a proscribed intent, its impact on the
competitiveness of U.S. securities markets is very different from that of a pure antifraud provision.
As seen above, the latter does not discourage the conduct of legitimate business transactions, while
its aggressive enforcement enhances the overall luster of U.S. exchanges. In contrast, the
distribution rules, like the rain, fall on the good and the bad alike, and the available evidence further
points to the fact that Rule 1Ob-6 visits social costs greatly in excess of its gain. This appears evident
from the tremendous volume of no-action letters granted for Rule lOb-6 balanced against the
extremely slender number of successful prosecutions under that rule.
79. United States v Darby, 857 F2d 623, 630-31 (9th Cir 1988) (quoting State v Zayas, 490 A2d 68,
73 (Conn 1985)). But did he really say it? Willie Sutton denies he did, "The irony of [the quote is]
... the fact that I never said it. The credit belongs to some enterprising reporter who apparently felt
a need to fill out his copy. I can't even remember when I first read it. It just seemed to appear one
day, and then it was everywhere." Willie Sutton, Where the Money Was 120 (Viking Press, 1952). See
also Paul F. Boiler, Jr. & John George, They Never Said It - A Book of Fake Quotes, Misquotes, and
Misleading Attributions 121 (Oxford U Press, 1989). The author's firm belief is that the statement
makes so much sense, anyone should be proud to claim making it, and he does.
80. Two other regulatory provisions that rival Rule lOb-6 in this area are Rule 144, 17 CFR
§ 230.144 (1992), dealing with resales of restricted and control securities and the newly adopted
rules under section 16 of the Exchange Act, which expands the reporting requirements for purchases
and sales of securities by the officers and directors of large, public corporations.
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from contrived demand. A regulatory approach that depends so heavily on
the informal exemptive process of no-action letters places U.S. issuers and
markets at a serious disadvantage to those who place the venue of the
transaction elsewhere. So viewed, the concessions the SEC has extended to
globalized offers are much like sweeping the litter under the rug. The
problem is removed from sight, but not beyond our feet.8 '
V
EVIDENCE OF COMPETITIVE DISEQUILIBRIUM IN THE UNITED STATES
The problem with the model of intermarket competition suggested by
capital market theory is that its utility lies in its abstract arraying of capital
markets in a hierarchy according to the strictness of their regulatory demands.
The image lacks concreteness, however. It has no predictive capability as to
whether a precise regulation or group of regulatory initiatives will yield
benefits commensurate with their costs. One wishing to move from the
model's abstract prescription to a specific policy position may well find the
model a somewhat empty standard. Because the competition among markets
is adjudged on the synergistic whole of a nation's regulations versus those of
competing markets, the model will be of little value in gauging whether a
specific regulatory issue will place the country at a competitive disadvantage
overall. The model is useful, however, in characterizing the status quo so that
policy judgments can be made with a healthy awareness of where the
individual country is on the regulatory continuum. The data below make such
a review and offer a not-too-reassuring assessment of the competitiveness of
U.S. securities laws.
The evidence suggests that the disclosure system embodied in U.S. federal
securities laws is not in the competitive equilibrium described in Part II.
Recall that in such an equilibrium state, the higher disclosure costs in the
United States are expected to be accompanied by lower capital costs, and the
lower disclosure costs of foreign markets are expected to be accompanied by
higher capital costs. Unless there is some reason to expect a bias favoring
lower disclosure costs over lower capital costs, one would not expect to find
over time any systematic defection by issuers or investors from one market to
81. There is ample reason to believe that the overregulation the SEC has achieved through its
distribution rules, and especially Rule 10b-6, if challenged, would be held to be an invalid exercise of
rulemaking power. The enabling provision for the distribution rules is § 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
which the Supreme Court has held to require scienter by the defendants. SEC v Aaron, 446 US 680
(1980). Within § 10(b) the operative language upon which the distribution rules rely is
"manipulative," which language the courts have interpreted to require proof that a series of trades
were undertaken with the specific intent to affect the security's price. See United States v Mulheren, 938
F2d 364 (2d Cir 1991) (dismissed because no specific intent found); United States v Regan, 937 F2d
823 (2d Cir 1991) (upholding finding that evidence supported finding specific intent to manipulate).
In spite of these authorities, Rules lOb-6 and lOb-7 do not incorporate a specific intent
requirement. Against this background, the reasoning of a leading Rule lOb-6 case, Jaffee & Co. v
Securities and Exchange Commission, 446 F2d 387, 391 (2d Cir 1971), that the Commission "need not
have shown that Jaffee actually intended to defraud the marketplace through his purchases," appears
no longer valid. See generally Fred N. Gerard & Michael Hirschfeld, The Scienter Requirement under
Rule lOb-6, 46 The Bus Lawyer 777 (1991).
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the other. Yet the following data strongly support the view that, overall, the
marginal cost of mandated disclosure in the United States overwhelms the
resulting benefit.
Foreign issuers who list their shares on U.S. exchanges or who offer their
securities in the United States subject themselves to U.S. disclosure laws. The
data show a serious imbalance between the eagerness of foreign firms to
expose themselves to U.S. securities laws and the willingness of U.S. firms to
list and raise capital abroad. Consider that in 1986, 199 U.S. firms were listed
on the London Stock Exchange, whereas only forty-nine foreign companies'
shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange.8 2 Far more revealing
here is a comparison between the United States and a specific foreign
country's experiences. In 1989, sixty-seven U.S. corporations listed their
shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, compared to only eight Japanese
corporations that listed their shares on the New York Stock Exchange and
none listing on the American Stock Exchange or NASDAQ Additionally,
only sixteen Japanese American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") are traded on
NASDAQ83 In contrast, ninety-three Japanese firms are admitted for listing
on the London Stock Exchange.8 4 The far larger number of Japanese firms
listing their shares on the London Stock Exchange than on any U.S. exchange
or NASDAQ is consistent with the view that Japanese companies (and
certainly other foreign issuers) do not find that the benefits of listing their
shares in the United States provide sufficient reward for the additional
disclosure duties and associated costs. Such data elicited a bit of
understatement from the SEC's staff: "U.S. stock markets have not kept pace
with other stock markets around the world in attracting foreign listings."' 5
Further evidence that the United States is inhospitable to foreign issuers is
that in 1977 registered public offerings by foreign issuers represented
thirteen percent of all registrations (in dollar amount), whereas by 1986 this
had fallen to three percent.8 6 Even this figure does not tell the whole story.
Approximately sixty-four percent of the foreign registrations in the United
States are by foreign governments, so that it is safe to say that the United
States plays a minuscule role in the capital raising activities of private foreign
companies, and the foreign companies that so tap United States investors are
most frequently Canadian.8 7 In contrast, U.S. firms in 1986 issued about
82. Report on Internationalization of Securities Markets before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong,
1st Sess 11-64 (July 27, 1987) (report by the staffofthe SEC) ("1987 SEC Staff Report"). It should be
noted that there were 52 foreign firms listed for trading on the Tokyo exchange. Id. The London
Stock Exchange still has more listings than all United States exchanges, which had 123 foreign
equities in 1986, up only slightly from 116 equities ten years earlier. Id at 11-82.
83. Terry M. Chuppe, Hugh R. Haworth & Marvin G. Watkins, The Securities Markets in the 1980s.
A Global Perspective (1989). The number of Japanese firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange
increased to nine by January 1992. (Letter on File with office of Law and Contemporary Problems.)
84. Letter to ProfessorJames D. Cox from the London Stock Exchange (June 6, 1991) (on file
with the office of Law and Contemporary Problems).
85. 1987 SEC Staff Report at 11-81 (cited in note 82).
86. Id at 11-82.
87. Id at 11-82 to -83.
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twenty-five percent of their bonds through offerings in foreign countries,
whereas in 1980 they raised only about twelve percent internationally.88
Similar growth in raising capital abroad can be found for funds raised by
issuing equity securities abroad.89
Both the reluctance of foreign issuers to list their shares for trading in the
United States and the larger number of U.S. issuers who raise capital abroad
point to a single financial truth: the overall rewards of investing and raising
capital abroad are greater than the discounting that occurs due to less
demanding foreign disclosure standards.
In contrast to the data concerning foreign and U.S. issuers, the data show
that foreign investors trade in U.S. markets far more often than U.S. investors
trade in foreign markets. Government statistics reveal that in 1989 foreign
purchases and sales in U.S. securities markets was $416 billion, whereas
purchases by U.S. residents in foreign markets was $230 billion.90 Equally
interesting is recent data gathered by Solomon Brothers, International, Ltd.,
on international stock purchases. Its report shows that U.S. investors will
purchase more than twice as much in dollar amounts of foreign stocks as
foreign traders will purchase in U.S. markets. 9' To add perspective, foreign
investment in U.S. stocks in 1991 will be $14.2 billion, in Japanese stocks will
be $31.6 billion, and in British stocks will be $7.4 billion.92 The data suggest
a growing interest on the part of U.S. investors to diversify their portfolios
internationally and a continuing interest of foreign investors to do the same.
The disproportionate interest in foreign residents' purchases in the United
States versus U.S. residents' purchases abroad is consistent with the thesis
that efforts to assure the overall fairness of U.S. securities markets make those
markets more attractive havens for investment activity.
It is upon this philosophy that the United States' aggressive pursuit of
insider trading, misleading financial reports and announcements, market
manipulation, and prophylactic distribution rules find their primacy. The
beneficiaries are not solely investors, but are also the many local financial
intermediaries who feast upon those flocking to partake in the world's
cleanest markets. Nevertheless, the above data strongly suggest that U.S.
markets are not attractive to foreign issuers, who much prefer to raise their
capital elsewhere. The concern of foreign issuers is not solely the greater
disclosure demands that apply to them when they offer their securities for sale
or list their shares on U.S. exchanges. They also have a quite legitimate fear
of the prevalence of securities fraud class actions. The next two sections
88. Id at 11-87.
89. Id at 11-55 to -57.
90. These figures represent all securities trading. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of
Treasury, Treasury Bulletin table CM-V-5 (Spring 1990).
91. More precisely, in 1991 U.S. citizens were expected to invest $26.3 billion in foreign stocks
(compared to $11.9 billion in 1990), and foreign investors were expected to purchase $14.2 billion of
U.S. stocks (compared to an overall net withdrawal from U.S. markets of $15.1 billion in 1990).
Michael R. Sesit, U.S., Europe Take the Lead in Global Stock Investments, Wall St J CI col 2-3 (Oct 17,
1991).
92. Id.
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suggest ways in which U.S. securities laws can address these concerns without
weakening their disclosure rules.
VI
MAKING U.S. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS COMPETITIVE
Because the experiences discussed above minimally challenge the existing
disclosure orthodoxy, it is appropriate to reexamine the overall content of
U.S. disclosure rules. At one time, this reexamination would have been
viewed as throwing in the towel much too soon. The attitude through much
of the 1980s was that the United States should use its exulted disclosure
standards as a "bully pulpit" by which to raise the disclosure standards of
other countries. This, of course, has been tried and has met with some
success. It is now clear, however, that at least European disclosure practices
93
have evolved about as far as can be expected. The hard-line negotiations that
have produced some movement in the European Community, and Britain
especially, must now give way to reconciliation. It is clearly time to turn our
attention to our own disclosure requirements. A few principles will guide this
evaluation.
A. Asymmetric Disclosure Rules
In overview, I foresee the need for a major shift in emphasis in
Regulations S-X and S-K. Minimally, the utility of their numerous
requirements must. be reassessed in light of the listing requirements of
competing jurisdictions. But more is required than this. Quite independent
of the type of comparative review suggested above, the demands of
Regulation S-X and S-K should be reduced substantially. In making this
second level of review, the Commission should not be neutral in its
prescriptions between the disclosure of "good" news and "bad" news. The
approach suggested here, while at first appearing to accept the thesis of the
Chicago School, includes an important modification. Those who prefer Adam
Smith's invisible hand to the heavy hand of the Commission have long advised
that managers have natural incentives to disclose information. 94 The
traditional pro-regulatory view is that reporting requirements are necessary
because managers lack sufficient incentives to disclose trustworthy corporate
information. There is also the fear that absent mandatory disclosure rules,
managers will disclose material information only after they have exploited its
value for private gain by insider trading. Those who counsel a laissez-faire
disclosure regime, meanwhile, argue that managers will engage in necessary
93. See, for example, Harmony and Wariness Coexist at ISOCO's Conference in Venice, 2 Intl Sec Reg
Rep (BNA) No 20 at 1 (Sept 27, 1989) (reporting that at the annual meeting of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, members expressed resistance to increasing their
regulation of securities transactions).
94. See, for example, George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am Econ Rev 132 (1973); GeorgeJ. Stigler, Public Regulation of the
Securities Markets, 37 J Bus 117 (1964).
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voluntary disclosure because such disclosure not only increases the value of
their firm, but also maximizes the managers' utility:9 5
To see how this works, take a simple example of a firm that wants to issue new
securities. The firm has a project.., that it expects to be profitable. If the firm simply
asked for money without disclosing the project and managers involved, however, it
would get nothing. Investors would assume the worst, because they would reason that
if the firm had anything good to say for itself it would do so. Silence means bad news.
A firm with a good project, seeking to distinguish itself from a firm with a mediocre
project (or no project at all), would disclose the optimal amount of information. That
is, it would disclose more and more so long as the cost of disclosure (both direct costs
of dissemination and indirect costs of giving information to rivals) was worthwhile to
investors as a whole ....
The process works for bad news as well as for good news. Once the firm starts
disclosing it cannot stop short of making any critical revelation, because investors
always assume the worst. It must disclose the bad with the good, lest investors assume
that the bad is even worse than it is. And the firm cannot stand on its say-so alone.
Mere disclosure would be enough if the rule against fraud were perfectly enforced, but
it is not. Thus the firm uses ... verification and certification devices.
96
The most glaring weakness in the view that mandatory disclosure rules are
unnecessary is the assertion that managers approach disclosure of bad news
with the same fervor as good news. All studies of voluntary disclosure
practices, and even studies of mandatory disclosures, reveal a distinct
managerial bias against disclosing "bad" news. Whether the subject studied
is the voluntary release of a financial forecast or the release of the company's
annual report (the disclosure of which is mandated by the securities laws), the
results are consistent; management systematically avoids release of "bad"
news forecasts and delays the release of mandated information when that
information is "bad" news.9 7 Moreover, insiders appear not only to trade in
their company's stock before the release of a financial forecast, but the
strength of the correlation between the frequency of insider purchases and
their forecasts is directly related to the forecast's ultimate impact on the
stock's price.9 8 Hence, insiders appear to be excellent judges of whether an
upcoming forecast is likely to affect materially their stock's price.
Even though the evidence does not support the laissez-faire world
counselled by the Chicago School, it does support a reorientation of present
disclosure rules. Not surprisingly, there is far greater reluctance to disclose
"bad" news than "good" news, and there is evidence that insiders capitalize
on their advance knowledge of the disclosure by trading in their corporation's
95. See generally Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern
Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in Franklin R. Edwards, ed, Issues in Financial Regulation 177
(McGraw-Hill, 1979); see also Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305 (1976).
96. Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70
Va L Rev 669, 682-83 (1984).
97. For a full review of these studies, see James D. Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the
Production of Information: Theory and Evidence, 64 Wash U L Q475 (1986).
98. See Stephen H. Penman, Insider Trading and the Dissemination of Firm's Forecast Information, 55J
Bus 479 (1982). For a discussion of how the manager's insider trading can be harnessed to the goal
of signaling the authenticity of financial announcements, see Cox, 64 Wash U L Q at 475, 502-05
(cited in note 97).
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stock. Curbing the frequency of insider trading cannot be a justification for
the status quo disclosure requirements. Reports filed under section 16 of the
Exchange Act show that corporate insiders systematically garner abnormal
returns by trading in their corporation's shares; 99 given the natural incentives
to release "good" news and the discretion managers enjoy to delay the release
of mandated "good" news where there are competing business justifications
for delaying disclosure, it would appear public policy would not be seriously
affronted if the orientation of our mandatory disclosure rules tilted toward the
regulation of "bad" news rather than "good" news. The evidence supports
the view that relaxing disclosure guidelines as they pertain to information
having a materially favorable impact on the firm's financial position and
performance would not operate to the disadvantage of investors. On the
other hand, the proper role of disclosure guides should be to mandate
disclosure of the type of information that management is less likely to
disclose.' 00 If this approach were taken, it would also accommodate the
competitive concerns raised in the next section.
B. Weighing the Competitive Disadvantages of Disclosure
For twenty-five years after World War II, both U.S. industry and its
regulators basked in the comfortable climate the devastation of Europe and
Japan left at its commercial door. Certainly disclosure demands could be
more easily imposed when the dent of competition was felt only by those
subject to the same rules. Although the world has become a much more
competitive environment in the past two decades, the regulatory mentality has
not kept pace with the changes in commercial markets and regulatory
pressures from abroad. Certainly disclosure requirements cannot be
formulated with a blind eye to the competitive business climate within which
U.S. registrants operate. This is a factor that needs consideration and again
calls for the comparative approach recommended above. To move from
rhetoric to a more concrete analytic approach, the next section examines the
disclosure issues posed by two items that are not common in foreign
countries-quarterly reports and line of business reporting.
There can be no serious question about the utility of quarterly reports and
lines of business disclosures to investors. Their materiality is documented by
a string of event studies that reflect the utility of this information to investors.
Despite the recognized value of quarterly report and line of business
information, the United States stands alone in mandating disclosure of each
for its domestic issuers. Interestingly, the United States does permit some
99. See, for example, James H. Lorie & Victor Neiderhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of
Insider Trading, 11J L & Econ 35 (1968).
100. See, for example, In the Matter of Caterpillar Inc, SEC Admin Proceeding File No 3-7692
(Mar 31, 1992), where SEC charged the company with failing to inform investors that nearly 25% of
its 1989 earnings came from Brazil and failed to warn that such a strong performance was unlikely to
recur in 1990.
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modest escape from its requirements for foreign issuers.' 0 Indeed, line of
business reporting has been the item most frequently singled out by foreign
issuers who complain about the disclosure demands of Regulation S-K.
Quarterly reports and line of business information are similar in that they
both contain information already in possession of management. As part of
management's stewardship of the firm, managers will have such reports
prepared for them on a regular basis. To be sure, if quarterly reports were
not mandated, it may be that managers would prefer a different reporting
method, although it would nevertheless be bound by the necessity of an
annual report to the stockholders. If a firm has two or more significant
divisions, the managers have an obligation to the firm and its owners to
disaggregate the total firm data, at least for those divisions that constitute a
large portion of the total firm's assets or contribute a significant portion of its
sales and earnings. So viewed, the impact of mandating disclosure of
quarterly and line of business information is incremental; the cost is incurred
in any case when supplying managers with information necessary for their
stewardship of the firm. The complaints of foreign issuers that they should be
exempt from these disclosure demands, therefore, appear insubstantial,
because it is quite likely that this information is already within their record
keeping and internal reporting systems so that the cost of making it publicly
available is minimal.
But the costs of disclosure are not simply the costs of generating the
mandated information. Disclosure costs also include some assessment of the
competitive disadvantages of making public what otherwise is proprietary
information. In this regard, there is a great difference between the issue of
mandating quarterly reports and mandating line of business information.
Intuitively, consideration of the anticompetitive effects of disclosure has more
weight in the line of business area than with quarterly reports because the
former is more likely to reveal ongoing business strategies vis-a-vis
competitors. The costs of such revelation may take the form of attracting the
competitors' attention to market or product areas where extraordinary
returns are being garnered. Such disclosure may also erode the advantage of
surprise by identifying undertakings where substantial assets are being
committed. These same concerns do not arise with quarterly reports because
individual product or market areas are not singled out for disclosure.
In 1984, the SEC proposed that line of business information be reported
quarterly. In the face of strong opposition, the proposal was dropped.
Among the complaints were those of established securities lawyers who
questioned the benefits of such disclosure in view of the related costs. In their
view, such information was softer than other mandated information because
of the need in interim reports to rely upon arbitrary assumptions on allocating
overhead and other shared costs among different divisions within the
101. Form 20-F, the reporting form for Foreign Issuers under the Exchange Act, requires
segmental information only for revenues. See Exchange Act Form 20-F General Instructions, 17
CFR § 249.220f (1992).
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company.' 0 2 Later, then-Commissioner Grundfest questioned whether the
quest for additional segmental reporting would produce any benefits in light
of the ample evidence that those to gain most from such disclosure would be
analysts less resourceful or skillful than other analysts at forecasting
performance of individual lines of business. 10 3  This argument again
highlights the weaknesses of premising disclosure requirements on the
information needs of users; even if all analysts would benefit from the
additional information, it is impossible to determine the true cost-and-benefit
relationship, because, in individual cases, firms may be seriously
disadvantaged by making this information available. If given the opportunity,
all firms could choose to insure against the potential disadvantage by offering
and listing their shares in a foreign market.
The new consideration advanced here is that even though information may
be readily available, the Commission needs to exclude categories of
information from mandatory disclosure requirements where disclosure of that
information may place issuers at a competitive disadvantage. Concern over
this disadvantage is not entirely neutralized by merely embracing the earlier
suggested approach toward the disclosure of adverse information rather than
positive information. The suggestion was directed in part toward reducing
overall disclosure costs by reducing the amount of information required to be
assembled, evaluated, and disclosed. Line of business information, however,
illustrates the type of information that is regularly available to issuers, such
that there are no significant new costs visited upon the issuer to generate the
information. Nevertheless, as noted above, disclosure of the information can
have distinct costs to the issuer. A far wiser approach to such areas is to
permit issuers to distinguish themselves by the degree of segmental
information they wish to reveal, leaving it to analysts to fill in the gaps with
alternative sources of information or by more heavily discounting the shares
of those companies whose disclosures are not as richly detailed and
revealing.l°4
The potential anticompetitive effects of disclosure transcend line of
business reporting and touch a wide array of disclosure items. The more
useful approach, therefore, and the one advocated here, would be for the SEC
to adopt a safe harbor that permits confidential information to be withheld by
registrants when management has a reasonable basis to believe that the best
interests of the company-or more particularly, its owners-are served by
nondisclosure. Consistent with the earlier recommendation that the focus of
102. See ABA Panel Members Oppose SEC Proposal to Increase Interim Segment Reporting, 16 Sec Reg & L
Rep (BNA) 929 (May 25, 1984).
103. Grundfest Stresses Economic Efficiency as Goal of Commission, Securities Laws, 18 Sec Reg & L Rep
(BNA) 1351, 1354 (Sept 19, 1986).
104. This indeed is, according to Commissioner Grundfest, what appears to be the case with
quarterly reporting of segmental information. Id. One can take this step further and suggest that no
mandated line of business information is required, thus allowing issuers to array themselves on this
issue according to the degree each issuer discloses, with higher discounting for those issuers who
disclose the least.
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mandatory disclosure be heavily oriented toward negative information, the
safe harbor would be limited to prospective plans, events, and negotiations as
well as existing conditions, the premature disclosure of which would either
thwart or seriously threaten the expected corporate gains. The safe harbor
would in some degree codify the reasoning of State Teachers Retirement Board v.
Fluor Corp. ,105 which held Fluor had not breached its disclosure obligations by
failing to announce it had secured a significant contract with South Africa
where the terms of that contract required that the announcement be delayed
for about two weeks to permit the South African government to secure
financing from a rival bidder. The proposed safe harbor would not allow a
corporation to engage in affirmative misstatements, however. For example,
the business justification advanced here is not intended to reverse Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson,' 0 6 which held that a denial of ongoing merger negotiations, when in
fact the firm was actively engaged in such negotiations, could be material
misrepresentation.10 7 In a sense, the safe harbor would bring SEC disclosure
requirements-at least as to forward-looking, positive information-in line
with prevailing listing requirements on the exchanges. 10 8 Creating a safe
harbor would be more efficient than conducting a wholesale review of all SEC
disclosure requirements to identify those likely to pose competitive
disadvantages. Because nearly any disclosure requirement in a particular
setting poses such a disadvantage, it is difficult to identify those deserving of
relaxation. '0 9
105. 654 F2d 843 (2d Cir 1983).
106. 485 US 224 (1988).
107. Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that opinions of a transaction's merits
that are inconsistent with the underlying facts of those opining can give rise to a misrepresentation
because it constitutes a half-truth. Virginia Bankshares v Sandberg, - US -, Ill S Ct 2749 (1991).
The classic illustration of serving the corporate interest at the expense of investors and even
stockholders is Heit v Weitzen, 402 F2d 909 (2d Cir 1968), where false, pessimistic financial statements
were issued so as to hide from the government overcharges on government contracts. The safe
harbor proposed above would not change the Heit court's ruling that an "ulterior motive" does not
shield the corporation from its responsibility to avoid materially misleading public announcements.
108. See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, Rule 202.05 (interpreted to permit
disclosure delay for legitimate business purpose. Cf Fluor, 654 F2d 843) and American Stock
Exchange Guide (CCH) 10,122 (1991) (delay permitted if disclosure would prejudice the ability of
the company to pursue its corporate objective). In contrast, NASDAQ has no stated business
purpose exception. See National Association of Securities Dealers Manual, schedule D, pt II,
l(c)(15) (1986).
109. Professor Langevoort has also urged that registrants be allowed to withhold confidential
information subject to a balancing test whereby the company's interests outweigh the need for
prompt disclosure. Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 Harv L Rev 747, 791 (1985). To assure the business justification for nondisclosure is
fairly weighed, he commends the decision to the directors or senior management. Id at 792. His
proposal appears to involve uncertainty over whether the ex ante weighing will be the same as that
made by a court ex post and also requires proof of "significant risk of financial harm to the
shareholders" by disclosure. Id at 791. These qualifications appear to restrict access to the safe
harbor by robbing the provision of its certainty.
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VII
SQUEEZING THE BALLOON: THE PROBLEM OF RELAXING FORMAL
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
While not everyone will admit to it, most have at one time or another
delighted in squeezing a balloon. Air rushes from beneath one's hands,
causing another part of the balloon to swell. If the balloon is squeezed too
hard, it pops. Similarly, even if the mandatory disclosure obligations set forth
in Regulations S-X and S-K are reduced, the disclosure demands can be
expected to reappear (that is, "pop out") under the pressures of the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws. It is, of course, the antifraud provisions that
add not just discipline to the mandatory disclosure requirements, but an
expansion of the overall content of disclosures beyond the minimal
requirements of Regulations S-X and S-K. Giving further impetus to this
concern are the sobering statistics on the frequency with which U.S.
companies are the subject of securities class actions. One study reports that
one of every fourteen companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange has
been the subject of a securities fraud suit in the last three years.10 Equally
alarming is the well-documented pattern of suing companies whenever there
is a large drop in the market price of their shares, especially if the companies
have recently made public offerings."' And one commentator reports that
two major U.S. underwriters are the subject of seventy-three and sixty
securities fraud class actions, respectively."t 2 Certainly, nothing is more
feared by foreign issuers and market professionals than the thought that they
will become grist in U.S. securities class action mills. The above data suggest
that this fear is well deserved and is one that should be shared as well by
companies and market professionals operating within the United States.
A. Precertification Merit Review of Class Actions
The frequency of litigation, and particularly representative suit litigation,
is now part of the political debate in the United States. One is very much in
step with the White House" 3 in questioning the freedom attorneys enjoy to
110. Vincent E. O'Brien, The Class-Action Shakedown Racket, Wall St J A20 col 2-6 (Sept 10, 1991).
More startling is that Mr. O'Brien's sample of 330 cases rejects the sage view that it is the small, start-
up companies that are the subject of securities fraud suits. He finds that nine percent of the
defendant companies had been in business for less than five years, whereas 75% of those sued had
been in existence for more than ten years. Moreover, companies with assets greater than $30 billion
in annual revenues were sued as often as those with $10 billion in annual revenues.
111. Michael Selz, Lawsuits Often Follow when Small Firms Go Public, Wall St J B2 col 3-6 (Jan 13,
1992).
112. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
Stan L Rev 497, 558 (1991).
113. Allesandra Stanley, The 1992 Campaign: Issues-Tort Reform: Selling Voters on Bush, as Nemesis of
Lawyers, NY Times AI col 2-4 (Aug 31, 1992) ("George Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle have
begun painting Bill Clinton as a captive of a special interest group, 'sharp lawyers' in 'tasseled
loafers' who are. . . 'running wild,' terrorizing doctors and even Little League coaches with personal-
injury suits, malpractice suits and other kinds of liability cases."); David S. Broder & Saundra Torry,
ABA President Disputes Quayle on Litigation Proposals, Washington Post Al (Aug 13, 1991) ("ABA
President John J. Curtin, Jr .... told [Dan Quayle] that the administration was unfairly blaming the
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roam the marketplace with class actions and contingency fee arrangements,
mechanisms virtually unknown in other parts of the world. Although
suggested ways in which to harness the class action are made below, the
benefits of the securities class action must be identified. An earlier discussion
examined how each country's laws should proscribe and move resolutely
against market fraud.'" 4 This feature, above all others, should be the bedrock
for the content of any nation's securities laws. Absent honesty in the
disclosures that are mandated, the disclosure requirements are meaningless.
From a different perspective, one can hypothesize that the amount of foreign
investor trading in U.S. securities markets and the prices received on those
securities would be less if there were no private enforcement of the securities
laws in the United States. The ever-present private sanctions for misleading
statements adds further authenticity to the firm's disclosures and enhances
the attractiveness of U.S. markets to foreign investors. At the same time, the
fear of being the target of such a suit makes U.S. securities markets less
attractive to foreign issuers and is very much a part of a U.S. company's
decision to raise its capital abroad.
Any rollback in the disclosure demands of Regulations S-X and S-K may
well not save the forests from the ravages of lengthy prospecti. A good deal
of securities fraud actions are not based on outright lies, but on the
misrepresentations that arise from telling only half the truth; that is, a
statement is deemed "false" because material information was omitted that
was necessary to prevent what was disclosed from creating a false
representation.' '5  For example, a truthful statement about a merger's
positive effects on a winery's bottom line does not shield the registrant from
suit for failing to disclose that after the merger some of the winery's labels
would be bottled in magnum-size and not half-gallon containers."t 6 So
understood, there is a very grave risk that without changing the jurisprudence
surrounding private actions under the securities laws, there are only limited
possibilities of introducing any significant change in the overall mandatory
disclosure requirements of Regulations S-X and S-K.
legal profession for what Quayle had termed a $300 billion-a-year 'self-inflicted competitive
disadvantage' in the world economy." This rebuttal was in response to Quayle's "50-point 'civil
justice reform' proposal ... [which] includes caps on punitive damages, a 'loser pays' rule for legal
costs in certain types of lawsuits and stricter limits on discovery procedures and expert testimony.").
114. See notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
115. This demand is formally embodied in the filing requirements of the SEC, Rule 408 for the
Securities Act and Rule 12b-20 of the Exchange Act, and it is very much a fixture of the
jurisprudence of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See Basic, Inc. v Levinson, 485 US 224 (1988); TSC Industries,
Inc. v Northway, Inc., 426 US 438 (1975); see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v Sandberg, - US -, I1I S Ct
2749 (1991).
116. Jones v National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 484 F Supp 679 (SD NY 1979) (the company
argued omission was immaterial because proxy statement accurately forecast overall net income and
the forecast took account of switch to magnums). The case was subsequently settled for $750,000.
Jones v National Distillers & Chem. Corp., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 97,288
(SD NY 1980).
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Most reforms advanced for securities class actions focus on altering the
litigants' financial incentives.' 17 These suggestions range from altering the
way plaintiff's attorney's fees are determined to various fee-shifting
arrangements. Invariably coupled with these suggested changes are
settlement review standards designed to involve the class action court more
actively in reviewing the proposed settlement. Such proposals are each
positive steps toward increasing the overall beneficial effects private litigation
can have on reducing the cost of raising capital in U.S. markets. Nevertheless,
further reform appears necessary.
One proposal is to involve the courts in securities class actions in a
significant way earlier than at the settlement stage. The stakes involved in
such cases are too great to limit the judge's involvement at the preliminary
stage to determining whether to certify the class. This need is particularly felt
in the wake of evidence that certified securities class actions often result in
settlements in amounts bearing no relationship to the actions' merits. Early
class action cases agreed and embraced a merit review of the action as a
prelude to certifying the class.' 18 While this approach was held improper,1 9
amending Rule 23 to bring back the merit review process should be
reconsidered. A precertification review of the merits would serve a useful
screening function and provide the judge with an early view of meritorious
cases that could have other positive effects. 1 20 For example, an early
familiarity with a meritorious case would prove most useful in any subsequent
hearing on the fairness of a proposed settlement where there is substantial




In addition to the recommended procedural changes, a substantive change
in the law of "half-truths" under antifraud provisions is also needed to
accommodate the above revamping of mandatory disclosure requirements.
As seen earlier, the content of disclosure is guided not solely by Regulations
S-X and S-K, but also by the jurisprudence of implied causes of action, which
compel disclosures necessary to avoid a materially misleading representation.
Without changing the substance of the law of half-truths, no significant gains
117. See, for example, John Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintif's Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1 (1991);
John C. Coffee,Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large
Class Action, 54 U Chi L Rev 877 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintff as
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 L & Contemp Probs 5 (Summer 1985).
118. Doglow v Anderson, 43 FRD 472, 501 (ED NY 1968).
119. Eisen v Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 US 2140 (1974).
120. See Colleen M. Martin, Note, Merit-Based Class Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78
Va L Rev 967, 1023-36 (1992).
121. See Allegheny Corp. v Kirby, 313 F2d 327, 334-45 (2d Cir 1964) (Friendly dissenting) ("Once a
settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms with their former
adversaries to defend the joint handiwork.").
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are likely to occur in overall disclosure requirements because issuers will feel
obligated to disclose more than the mandatory disclosure regulations require.
One possible approach is to alter the materiality standard so that
information is material only if it would likely change the price at which
investors would purchase or sell a security, or more dramatically cause the
investors not to purchase or sell at all.' 22 This change is ill-advised for two
reasons, however. First, it is not likely to lead to the effects desired; plaintiff's
counsel may well be able to locate experts who can demonstrate materiality
even under the more demanding standard and establish a causal relationship
between the omission or misstatement and the damages to be recovered. In
cases where the alleged fraud was upon purchasing or selling shares in the
secondary trading market, the plaintiff must prove that the omission or
misstatement affected the price at which the security traded. 2 3 A second
concern with redefining materiality is it casts aside the certainty securities
practitioners can achieve by accessing the hundreds of decisions courts and
the SEC have handed down over the years on the meaning of materiality.
Abandoning this standard would increase the amount of uncertainty in
materiality determinations, just the opposite result that is sought by the
reform.
A far more fruitful and positive approach to the matter of half-truths is to
tighten the scienter requirement for omitted information. Where the
information omitted from an SEC filing is not required by Regulations S-X or
S-K, it would appear advisable to impose responsibility only if some element
of purpose or knowledge accompanied the affirmative decision to omit the
information. Minimally, this approach would require the rejection of the
recklessness standard embraced by the circuit courts of appeal for Rule lOb-5
actions.' 24 The standard suggested here is, however, only slightly more
demanding than the contemporary one under which scienter is established if
the defendant were aware of the true state of affairs and appreciated the
propensity of the information to mislead.125 What appears most appropriate
is not simply a conscious omission of the information-the information was
known or must have been known to the preparers of the filed statements-but
also that the information was knowingly omitted from the filing or
announcement in question, not inadvertently excluded. This change would
overcome the pernicious aspects of the contemporary recklessness standard
122. Currently, a statement or omission is material without "proof ofa substantial likelihood that
disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote" or
investment decision. TSC Industries, Inc. v Northway, Inc., 426 US 438, 449 (1975).
123. See, for example, Green v Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F2d 1335 (9th Cir 1976) (Sneed
concurring). More generally, see Braddord Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to
Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L Rev 883 (1990).
124. See Paul S. Milich, Securities Fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5: Scienter, Recklessness, and
the Good Faith Defense, 11 J Corp L 179 (1986) (reviewing the many articulations of recklessness under
the antifraud provision). Among the more liberal constructions of recklessness is that of the First
Circuit as being "carelessness approaching indifference." Hoffman v Eastbrook & Co., 587 F2d 509,
516 (1st Cir 1978).
125. See, for example, SEC v Falstaff Brewing Co., 629 F2d 62, 76 (DC Cir 1980).
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because the proposed standard would not impose liability for omissions
indifferently committed.
C. Rethinking Section 11 Liability Under the Securities Act
A final area worthy of reconsideration is the scope of liability under section
11 of the Securities Act for material omissions or misstatements in
registration statements. Under section 11, issuers are liable without fault,
whereas directors, underwriters, and those who sign the registration
statement are liable if they cannot establish a "due diligence" defense. 126
One of the distinct costs to issuers or underwriters contemplating a public
offering of securities in the United States is their respective exposure to
section 11 liability. The competitive disadvantages of U.S. public offerings
brought about by section 1 1 appear not simply in the frequency of securities
class actions following the collapse of a public offering's price,2 7 but also in
the absence of equally demanding standards for liability in rival foreign
markets.
The impact of liability under section 11 can be overstated or
misunderstood, however. One of the most famous securities cases, Escott v.
BarChris Construction Co.,i28 held that senior officers, outside directors,
underwriters, and an outside auditor all failed to satisfy their due diligence
defenses. By way of illustration, one outside director relied upon
representations by management that the registration statement was complete,
while his fellow director was faulted for, among other lapses, failing to
examine original documents bearing on whether projects listed as being
among the backlog of projects were in fact firm orders. The underwriters
were similarly faulted for not verifying data supplied to them by management.
The historical justification for imposing such burdensome demands on these
parties is the recognition that when an issuer is involved in a public offering of
its securities and its position conflicts with that of its offerees, issuers have
natural incentives to shade the truth. For this reason, intervention into the
disclosure process by a neutral referee has a good deal of appeal and thus
seems to be the overall mission of the due diligence requirements of section
11. This observation is particularly true for underwriters; among the
nonexperts to whom section 11 liability extends, underwriters enjoy the
greatest independence and financial sophistication, best equipping them to
discharge the public interest under the threat of section 11 liability.
126. This requires proof that the individual "had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe" the registration statement was free of material omissions and
misstatements when it became effective. Securities Act of 1933, ch 38, tit I § I l(b)(3)(A), 15 USC
§ 77k(b)(3)(A) (1933). As to any portion of the registration statement prepared on the authority of
an expert, nonexperts satisfy their defense if they "had no reasonable ground to believe and did not
believe" the registration statement contained a material misrepresentation. Securities Act
Amendments of 1934, ch 404, tit II § 206(b), 15 USC § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1934); see also Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v Sandberg, 111 S Ct 2749 (1991).
127. Selz, Wall St J at B2 col 3-6 (cited in note 11).
128. 283 F Supp 643 (SD NY 1968).
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However, the pressures of competition, including the advent of the
integrated disclosure mechanisms whereby large seasoned corporations can
quickly "go to market," have strained the traditional bond between issuers
and underwriters. 12 9 Issuers that qualify to use Forms S-2 or S-3 may go to
market more rapidly because they can incorporate by reference information
previously filed to satisfy their continuous reporting obligations under the
Exchange Act. The resulting process shortens the time the underwriter has to
fulfill its due diligence investigations, and the resulting competition for fees
further limits the resources underwriters commit to this part of their
undertaking.' 30 A -further question is whether underwriter liability is
necessary in light of the substantial reputational interest underwriters have at
stake, which is certainly the case when they serve as lead underwriters.' 3 '
Underwriters are the quintessential repeat player and, as such, suffer great
reputational injury when associated with offerings of securities whose prices
collapse soon after the offering, whether or not the collapse is linked to a
misleading prospectus. Thus, underwriters may carry out reasonable
investigation even in the absence of statutory liability. Such considerations
have caused Professor Langevoort to recommend removing underwriters
from section 11 liability, believing this would allow securities offering
practices to evolve to less costly, more efficient arrangements between issuers
and underwriters. '
32
Professor Langevoort's suggestions are intriguing, especially in light of the
increasing international competition among underwriters and markets.
Nevertheless, the exact reform desirable for section 11 liability quite probably
is an empirical question. With this approach in mind, the following
suggestions sketch areas worthy of investigation. The first is the desirability
of continuing to hold an issuer absolutely liable if its registration statement
contains a material misrepresentation. The concern here is not exclusively for
issuers, although it is hard to deny this provision does increase their offering
costs, but, more significantly, what effect the issuer's greater exposure has on
the likelihood that others, particularly underwriters, will be implicated in a
section 11 action. It appears to be an easy proposition that a plaintiff
attorney's marginal costs are not increased significantly by adding to a suit
against an absolutely liable issuer (assuming the registration statement
contained a material misrepresentation) causes of action against other
129. See Samuel L. Hayes, A. Michael Spence & Donald Von Praag Marks, Competition in the
Investment Banking Industry (Harvard U Press, 1983).
130. See generally Edward F. Greene, Determining the Responsibility of Underwriters Distributing
Securities within Integrated Disclosure System, 56 Notre Dame L Rev 755, 787-90 (1981).
131. See Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues
Market, 58 Va L Rev 776 (1972). However, there is at least one school of thought that argues the
systematic underpricing of securities offered in an IPO reflects compensation demanded by
underwriters for the negligence liability risks they incur. Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public
Offerings of Common Stock, 43J Finance 789 (1988).
132. Langevoort, 98 Harv L Rev at 776-78 (cited in note 109). He suggests the resulting void, if
any, in investigation of the registration statement could be filled in several ways, such as by
tightening up the demands on senior management officials or outside accountants.
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defendants, especially if those defendants have considerable resources.
Assuming a solvent issuer, plaintiff's counsel may currently conclude that a
reasonable settlement is more likely to be arrived at by implicating an issuer
and the forty-nine members of the underwriting syndicate rather than by
proceeding solely against the issuer. This is especially so if the settlement
amount proposed is not significant when divided fifty ways but would be
catastrophic if not divided at all.
At the same time, it is worth considering how great a cost is added to the
underwriting and offering process by the due diligence investigation required
by underwriters and others. On this point, it should be observed that courts
today appear more sympathetic to the problems faced by underwriters and
others in discharging their section 11 liability. Several recent decisions have
granted underwriters' and outside directors' motions for summary judgment
where there was evidence of their review of management-prepared reports
and selected outside sources in discharging their due diligence
investigation. 13
3
In sum, there needs to be a thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of
section 11 liability for issuers as well as those subject to the due diligence
obligations of section 11, including a close review of who actually discharges
the investigation demanded by section 11. If these are issuer-related
investigations, such that it is the issuer's counsel and attorneys that perform
much of the investigation relied upon by underwriters, there are substantial
additional costs beyond those that the underwriter would have undertaken
merely to apprise itself whether to become involved in the offering and the
appropriate price for the offering. Investigations that transcend these
concerns add costs beyond those necessary for the underwriter to inform
itself reasonably as to the advisability of its participation and the pricing of the
offering. Such additional costs are the true costs of section 11 liability. To
the extent the investigations eclipse similar investigations conducted for
foreign offerings, they place U.S. offerings at a competitive disadvantage if the
resulting reduction in the costs of capital is not commensurate with the
investigation costs. The remaining focus is whether the exposure of
underwriters and others to the costs of litigation is enhanced by the issuer
being deprived of a due diligence defense under section 11. Resolving both
questions can tell us much about the competitiveness of U.S. laws for public
offerings versus those of rival nations.
VIII
CONCLUSION
Technological developments have exposed the United States to
international regulatory competition that will not abate. This article urges the
133. See, for example, Weinberger v Jackson, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH)
95,693 (ND Ca 1990); Laven v Flanagan, 695 F Supp 800 (D NJ 1988); Competitive Associates v
International Health Sciences, [1975 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 94,966 (SD NY 1975);
In re Avant-Guarde Computing, Inc. Litigation, 1989 WL 103625 (D NJ 1989).
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United States to meet that challenge and sets forth principles to meet it
without resort to a "race to the bottom." First, the article illustrated that
regulatory competition is healthy, provided the points in competition do not
afford opportunities for managerial opportunism. The United States needs to
continue its lead in bringing about mutual understanding in disclosure
requirements that curb both managerial opportunism and the manipulation of
reports. As was seen, this does not require harmony in disclosure standards;
differences can well exist among countries over the depth and details of their
disclosures. There is a grave need, however, to improve international
disclosure standards in those areas, such as reserve accounting, where
management can create the false appearance of economic activity.
The article also showed that the United States should avoid those
accommodations that have the perverse effect of driving securities
transactions to foreign markets. Relieving multinational transactions of U.S.
regulatory burdens because of their de minimis effects in the United States
makes sense only when domestic investor interests are better served by
relaxing those regulatory protections. In other instances, there is a real need
to reexamine the utility of the United States' marginally more demanding
requirements. The case in point examined earlier is the overly broad
demands of U.S. distribution rules.
The United States must also begin the wholesale review of the content of
both its disclosure requirements and antifraud rules. As developed above, the
former cannot be relaxed effectively unless the demands of the express and
implied causes of action under the securities laws are effectively narrowed. If
this can be done, then Regulations S-X and S-K can, as suggested here, be
reviewed to identify those areas where mandatory disclosure requirements are
necessary in light of the otherwise weak incentives managers have to disclose
financially significant information.
In sum, U.S. securities laws are now at their zenith in terms of their
demands and protection of investors. They provide a pure and pristine image
of the wonderful protective benefits that can arise through government
regulation. Those laws are enforced aggressively by public and private
enforcement actions, but most importantly through their in terrorem effects.
But internationalization most assuredly commits our present regulatory
structure to the museum of days gone past; it is now time to station our
markets and their participants for the realities of the twenty-first century by
engaging in a wholesale review and deregulation of U.S. securities laws. The
principles developed above provide a framework within which such change
can occur so as to preserve the protection investors currently enjoy under the
securities laws.
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